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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Partido Nacionalista de Puerto Rico (PNPR) and the Ação Integralista 
Brasileira (AIB) are two of several political movements in Latin America and elsewhere 
during the turbulent decade of the 1930s that asserted a nationalist and revolutionary 
platform through military-like internal organization and recourse to violence. These 
parties, although their rank-and-file was always a small minority of the population, were 
crucial players in the political life of their respective countries, and exerted on them an 
influence that was broader and more significant than their size and duration could 
apparently reveal. The extent of this presence has surely to do with the two figures who 
built and energetically led the two organizations: Pedro Albizu Campos (1891-1965), 
who became president of the PNPR in 1930, and Plínio Salgado (1895-1875), who 
founded the AIB in 1932. They are peculiar characters who combined their efforts as 
political activists with an ambitious and refined intellectual production that provided the 
ideal basis on which their movements operated on the public scene. Their analysis of 
global and local circumstances, their values and ideals, their conceptions of the human 
being, society and state, their political programs, in short, their ideology, are the subject 
of my research. Some heuristic notions that European scholars of fascist studies 
developed since the 1990s, with the double purpose of providing a more focused 
designation of the phenomenon and of starting a broader and promising operation of 
comparative history, within and outside Europe, constitute the theoretical framework of 
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my work. Specifically, I employ the concepts of “political religion”, as it was elaborated 
and used by Emilio Gentile, and Roger Griffin’s formulation of “generic fascism”. 
The primary sources of my work are pamphlets, speeches, articles, and books 
produced by Albizu and Salgado immediately before and during the period of peak of 
their parties’ activity, that is, between 1930 and 1937. The former year witnessed the 
election of Albizu as president of the PNPR, which consequently experienced a striking 
change in its platform, and the embryonic idea of the AIB by Salgado: significantly, at 
the time both figures were just back from long and intense journeys, in Latin America 
and Europe respectively. The latter year – 1937 – marked the dramatic end of the 
centrality of those two experiences, as a consequence of traumatic events in their 
countries: in Puerto Rico, an escalation of violence between pro-independence militants 
and U.S. colonial authorities led to the incarceration and conviction of Albizu and other 
nationalist officers in late 1936; in Brazil, the schemes that President Vargas hatched to 
remain in power ended, in November 1937, in a coup and the establishment of the Estado 
Novo, which banned all the political parties and, in 1939, forced Salgado to exile in 
Portugal. The majority of the primary sources are available in periodicals and volumes 
published at the time, and now preserved in libraries and archives in Puerto Rico, Brazil, 
and the United States. A few recent anthologies of Albizu and Salgado’s texts are still 
accessible, and are particularly useful to study the intellectual trajectory of the Puerto 
Rican leader, who, unlike his Brazilian counterpart, was not a systematic publisher of his 
work and did not elaborate substantial doctrinaire volumes. 
The stimulus to approach these topics in a comparative fashion, in spite of the 
hazards involved in matching two somehow very distant realities like Puerto Rico and 
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Brazil, came not simply from some superficial analogies that an observer can recognize 
in the chronology or in the trajectory of the PNPR and the AIB. Indeed, the main impulse 
was an evaluation of the literature on those issues produced by historians in the last 
decades, and what I would dare to define a dissatisfaction with this literature. 
The case of Pedro Albizu Campos and the PNPR is, in my opinion, the most 
ticklish. Since their experience is still considered fundamental in the struggle for Puerto 
Rican sovereignty, both the party and its head have received considerable attention from 
intellectuals who have addressed the complex problem of the colonial status of the island. 
Nevertheless, a celebratory and apologetic purpose clearly prevails against a passionless 
and methodologically correct analysis in the vast majority of the publications. Followers 
and relatives of Albizu had a prominent role in the building of his myth,1 and, in spite of 
his centrality in the modern history of Puerto Rico, the number of rigorous studies on the 
subject published by independent scholars is not large.2 Some interesting dissertations, 
theses, and academic essays were also produced, mainly in the United States, but they 
obviously did not have a notable impact on the general public, due to their limited 
                                                 
1 By way of example, Albizu’s right hand man, the poet and leader of the Liga Socialista Juan Antonio 
Corretjer, published Albizu Campos (Montevideo, Uruguay: El Siglo Ilustrado, 1969); another former 
member of the PNPR and personal friend of Albizu, Juan Rodríguez Cruz, wrote Pedro Albizu Campos. Un 
asomo a su vida y su época (San Juan, PR: Centro de Estudios Avanzados de Puerto Rico y el Caribe; 
Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 1994); Albizu’s Peruvian wife, Laura Meneses, edited Albizu Campos y 
la independencia de Puerto Rico, 2nd ed. (Hato Rey, PR: Publicacione Puertorriqueñas, 2007). 
2 The list of noteworthy and somehow innovative studies on Albizu’s nationalism could be narrowed to: 
Taller de Formación Política, La cuestión nacional: el Partido Nacionalista y el movimiento obrero 
puertorriqueño (aspectos de las luchas económicas y políticas de la década de 1930-40) (San Juan, PR: 
Ediciones Huracán, 1982); Luis Angel Ferrao, Pedro Albizu Campos y el nacionalismo puertorriqueño, 
1930-1939 (San Juan, PR: Editorial Cultural, 1990); Taller de Formación Política, Pedro Albizu Campos: 
¿conservador, fascista o revolucionario? (comentarios al libro de Luis A. Ferrao, Pedro Albizu Campos y 
el nacionalismo puertorriqueño) (Río Piedras, PR: Editorial Grafito, 1991); Kátia Gerab Baggio, A questão 
nacional em Porto Rico: o Partido Nacionalista (1922-1954) (São Paulo, Brasil: FAPESP, Annablume, 
1998); Marisa Rosado, Las llamas de la aurora: acercamiento a una biografia de Pedro Albizu Campos, 
2nd ed. (San Juan, PR: Editora Corripio, 1998); Isabel Gutiérrez del Arroyo, Pedro Albizu Campos o la 
agonía moral. El mensaje ético de Pedro Albizu Campos (San Juan, PR: Editora Causa Común 
Independentista, 2000); José Juan Rodríguez Vázquez, El sueño que no cesa. La nación deseada en el 
debate intellectual y politico puertorriqueño 1920-1940 (San Juan, PR: Ediciones Callejón, 2004). 
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circulation. Interestingly enough, those works, in comparison with the majority of the 
published books, show a far deeper attention to the roots and the characteristics of 
Albizu’s ethical and political thought.3 As Kátia Gerab Baggio acutely observed, two 
goals prevailed in the literature on Albizu and the PNPR: the celebrative one, and the 
search for the reasons of their failure in achieving Puerto Rican independence from the 
United States.4 Nevertheless, a highly controversial issue that constantly is raised in the 
political and historiographical debate on Albizu’s nationalism is the question of its 
categorization and, specifically, of its similarities with European fascism. The dispute is 
usually summarized in every extended essay on the subject,5 and is intermingled with 
current political discussions on the status of Puerto Rico, the attitude of the pro-
independence circles, and the legitimacy of violence. In short, scholars who emphasize 
the affinities of the PNPR with fascism and other radical right-wing experiences produce 
a variety of evidence: among them, a sympathetic stance toward Spanish conservatism 
and, to a lesser extent, with Franco’s forces during the tumultuous 1930s in Spain; the 
organization within the party of a paramilitary youth organization, the Cadetes de la 
República, which adopted symbols and principles that resemble those of the Italian Fasci 
                                                 
3 Antonio M. Stevens Arroyo, The Political Philosophy of Pedro Albizu Campos: Its Theory and Practice, 
Ibero-American Language and Area Center, Occasional Papers, no. 13 (New York: New York University, 
1974); Dolores Stockton Helffrich Austin, “Albizu Campos and the development of a Nationalist ideology, 
1922-1932” (M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin - Madison, 1983); Joseph Michael Ferri, “Pedro Albizu 
Campos, ‘El Maestro’: translation and rhetorical analysis of selected speeches” (Ph.D. diss., Temple 
University, 1988); Antonio M. Stevens Arroyo, Catholicism as civilization: contemporary reflections on 
the political philosophy of Pedro Albizu Campos, Caribbean Institute and Study Center for Latin America, 
Working Papers, no. 50 (San Germán, PR: Inter American University of Puerto Rico, 1992); Charles R. 
Venator Santiago, “The other nationalists: Marcus Garvey and Pedro Albizu Campos” (M.A. thesis, 
University of Massachusetts at Amherst, 1996); René Antrop-González, ‘This school is my sanctuary’: the 
Dr. Pedro Albizu Campos Alternative High School, Julian Samora Research Institute, Working Papers, no. 
57 (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University, 2003). 
4 Baggio, A questão nacional em Porto Rico, 85-86. 
5 Concise but complete presentations of the question are Ferrao, Pedro Albizu Campos y el nacionalismo 
puertorriqueño, 60-74; Baggio, A questão nacional em Porto Rico, 85-86; Rodríguez Vázquez, El sueño 
que no cesa, 205-209. 
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di Combattimento and the Spanish Falange; the sectarian organization of the movement, 
with a centralization of power and a radical intolerance for internal dissidence; finally, 
the use of violence as a political means, and its justification.6 If we exclude those who 
simply defended Albizu’s honor because of personal affection and preconceived ideas, 
we still find a multiplicity of refutations of the abovementioned interpretations. Two of 
them, both highly sophisticated, deserve consideration. Firstly, the Taller de Formación 
Política, a Marxist think tank formed in the 1980s, formulated for Albizu the definition of 
“revolucionario pequeño-burgués”.7 According to this standpoint, he and his party openly 
faced, for the first time, the U.S. occupation and its economic consequences, but they also 
accepted the capitalist system and rejected the notion of class struggle: therefore, the 
nationalist movement was clearly distinct from the socialist ideology, but, proposing 
radical reforms to limit the exploitation that capitalism generated, it came close to the 
interest of the proletariat.8 Secondly, José Juan Rodríguez Vázquez numbered the radical 
nationalism of the 1930s among a liberal and modernizing tradition: the author 
emphasized its reformist economic and political project, and considered Albizu’s 
idealization of the nation and bitter opposition to the U.S. rule as a simple “mecanismo de 
defensa político-cultural.”9 Those two versions, although they were built on very 
different approaches, converged on a sort of “normalization” of Albizuism. In fact, they 
proposed to consider it as a stage in a broader process, being it, in the case of the Taller, 
the construction of a popular and socialist pro-independence movement, and, in the case 
                                                 
6 These and other arguments constitute the frame of Ferrao, Pedro Albizu Campos y el nacionalismo 
puertorriqueño, that can be considered the most equilibrated among the researches which incline to an 
assimilation of Albizu’s PNPR to a loosely conceived category of fascism. 
7 Taller de Formación Política, La cuestión nacional, 127. 
8 Taller de Formación Política, La cuestión nacional, 99-206, and Taller de Formación Política, Pedro 
Albizu Campos, 27-79. 
9 Rodríguez Vázquez, El sueño que no cesa, 171. See also p. 170-194. 
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of Rodríguez Vázquez, a progressive definition of a political Puerto Rican nationalism, 
that later found a more moderate and stable formulation with Luis Muñoz Marín. 
The dilemma on the role that Albizu’s PNPR played into the overall development 
of Puerto Rican modern history shows affinities with the debate on Plínio Salgado and his 
Ação Integralista Brasileira. In fact, the historiography alternately treated both 
movements either as extremist deviations from general patterns of their countries’ 
history, or as phenomena that are fully comprehensible in the context of local fragilities 
and of a highly problematic decade like the 1930s. In the case of the AIB, until the 1960s 
Brazilian historians virtually ignored the topic, as a direct consequence of what was 
recently called “um discurso produzido pelos ‘vencedores’.”10 As a matter of fact, 
Salgado’s movement not only was banished in 1937, after some years of appreciable 
popular consensus, but Vargas and his supporters unscrupulously abstracted and rehashed 
its nationalist and populist claims, eroding the rank and file of the AIB and reusing 
against it the same propagandistic and repressive devices which informed the 
anticommunist campaign conducted in the central years of the 1930s.11 Integralism was 
accused of being deeply influenced by European fascism, in contradiction with its 
patriotic assertions, and that its proposed policy would have led to direct interferences by 
foreign regimes in the Brazilian scene. That issue became the critical question in the first 
wave of academic researches on the movement, in the 1970s. Indeed, the fascist nature of 
the AIB constitutes the central thesis of the most complete and influential work on the 
                                                 
10 Edgar Bruno Franke Serratto, “Estudos sobre o Integralismo e seus momentos,” in História e 
multidisciplinaridade: territórios e deslocamentos: anais do XXIV Simpósio Nacional de História (São 
Leopoldo: Unisinos, 2007), 2 [CD-ROM]. 
11 An innovative analysis of the intricate relationship between Vargas and the AIB, based on the reading of 
police records through the principles of Discourse Analysis and New Cultural History, is Giselda Brito 
Silva, “Uma proposta de análise interdisciplinar para os estudos do Integralismo,” Revista de História 
Regional 7, no. 2 (2002), 75-98. 
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subject, Integralismo: o fascismo brasileiro na década de 30, published by Hélgio 
Trindade in 1974.12 This book is above all a sociological study of the movement, that was 
conducted through a detailed analysis of the national and international context of the 
time, the internal organization of the party, and the profiles of its leaders and militants, 
whose personal motivations and ambitions were also explored. The conclusion is that the 
trajectory of the AIB was the product of the worldwide totalitarian wave of the interwar 
period, and that its relative popular success was mainly due to the appeal of nationalist 
and authoritarian ideas among people coming from the middle and lower bourgeoisie, in 
a difficult domestic economic and political phase. Trindade’s allegations stimulated other 
publications that rejected the validity of an interpretation of Integralism as a Brazilian 
variety of fascism. These authors, in spite of different methodological and ideological 
perspectives, centered their arguments on the observation that 1930s Brazil lacked the 
socio-economic structure that supposedly favored European Fascism, that is, elements 
such as an advanced industrialization process, a solid urban class, and the threat posed by 
a strong communist party. These works tried to demonstrate that Salgado’s doctrine and 
party were simply part of the 1920s and 1930s Brazilian debates on identity, nationalism 
and modernization.13 Since the late 1980s, Brazilian historiography showed a renewed 
attention for Integralism, starting to focus on specific cases in the conduct of the party on 
the ground and, consequently, producing a shift in the goals of scholarly works on the 
topic. In fact, the problem of the relations between the AIB and European fascism was 
                                                 
12 Hélgio Trindade, Integralismo: o fascismo brasileiro na década de 30 (São Paulo: Difusão Européia do 
Livro; Porto Alegre: UFRGS, 1974). 
13 This thesis is shared, for instance, by a Marxist scholar, José Chasin, in his O integralismo de Plínio 
Salgado: forma de regressividade no capitalismo hípertardio (São Paulo: Livraria Editora Ciências 
Humanas, 1978) and by a less ideologically aligned author, Gilberto Felisberto Vasconcelos, in his A 
ideologia curupira: análise do discurso integralista (São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1979). See also 
Serratto, 3-5. 
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marginalized, and researchers preferred to study, for example, the diffusion of 
Integralism among immigrant communities,14 and its pedagogy and means of 
propaganda.15 As a result, our knowledge of the AIB, as a movement that was inserted in 
the complex Brazilian society of the 1930s and interacted with a variety of actors and 
institutions, was dramatically increased. 
The historiography of both the PNPR and the AIB started early to engage with the 
question of the fascist label and its application to the targeted movements and their 
ideologists; nevertheless, it is undoubtedly still not univocally solved. Two reasons, in 
my opinion, could help to understand why this theme was always and continues to be 
highly controversial. First, fascism is an unwieldy term, being usually employed without 
a clear definition and, too often, with a pejorative and offensive acceptation: in this way, 
it alternatively functions, in the hands of those who disapprove a party or a doctrine, as an 
accusatory tool to discredit it, and, in the hands of those who defend it, as a proof of the 
bias or bad faith of non laudatory interpretations. Second, fascism is rarely defined as a 
political or historical concept, and scholars tend to refer to it as a nonspecific notion, 
focusing on features that in the common sense are associated with fascism, such as 
authoritarianism, intolerance, violence. This constitutes the rationale for applying a 
specific historiographical formulation of the notion of fascism to the two cases under 
consideration, and of focusing the attention more on the ideas and programs devised by 
the leaders than on the political behavior of the organizations as complex groups. In my 
opinion, this approach could facilitate further comparative work on the revolutionary 
                                                 
14 René Ernani Gertz, O fascismo no sul do Brasil: germanismo, nazismo, integralismo (Porto Alegre: 
Mercado Aberto, 1987) and João Fábio Bertonha, O fascismo e os imigrantes italianos no Brasil (Porto 
Alegre: EDIPUCRS, 2001). 
15 Rosa Maria Feiteiro Cavalari, Integralismo: ideologia e organização de um partido de massa no Brasil, 
1932-1937 (Bauru, SP: Editora da Universidade do Sagrado Coração, 1999). 
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right in interwar Latin America, and could permit the formulation of a broader picture of 
a phenomenon that, being grounded on extreme nationalism, scholars usually address 
within the borders of the nation-state.16 
                                                 
16 A remarkable exception is Sandra McGee Deutsch, Las Derechas: the Extreme Right in Argentina, 
Brazil, and Chile, 1890-1939 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). 
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CHAPTER II 
 
THEORIES AND METHODS IN FASCIST STUDIES 
 
Fascism, as a political concept and as a subject of academic study, has aroused 
discussions and polemics since it appearance on the Italian political scene immediately 
after the First World War. Many factors have made fascism a difficult notion and topic to 
define and analyze. To begin with, the majority of both advocates and opponents 
considered fascism more as a pragmatic political movement, or an institutional model for 
a dictatorial regime, than as a sophisticated ideology, with clearly structured theoretical 
principles and a clear conceptual profile. This dominant view produced a peculiar 
contradiction, since it allowed observers and scholars to use the fascist label rather 
indiscriminately to designate a broad variety of phenomena, in Europe and elsewhere, 
although many of them adopted different denominations: from German National 
Socialism to Spanish Falangism, from Romanian Iron Guard to Mexican Synarchism. 
This constitutes an important difference in comparison with communism, with which 
fascism was early associated under the broad category of totalitarianism. The system of 
supranational coordination established around the Socialist Internationals, and later the 
Comintern, and the ideological global hub of attraction constituted by the Soviet Union 
had no counterpart among “fascist” movements and regimes, that therefore lacked any 
form of stable organization outside of national borders.17 Last but not least, the rapid 
trajectory that historical forms of fascism experienced in less than three decades (1919-
                                                 
17 Some European intellectuals elaborated the project of a sort of “Fascist International” in late 1920s, but it 
did not materialize. This theme is covered in Michael Arthur Ledeen, Universal Fascism: The Theory and 
Practice of the Fascist International, 1928-1936 (New York: H. Fertig, 1972). 
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1945), from relative success and indubitable centrality during the interwar period, to 
disaster and marginalization at the end of the Second World War, significantly 
contributed to the trivialization and emptying of the category, that is still usually 
employed more in a polemical and accusatorial fashion than as a specific concept 
pertaining to political science or historiography. Even scholarly research often suffers 
from a mixing of political judgments with scientific interpretations: a fact that is 
commonly considered almost unavoidable in the face of such an extreme phenomenon.18 
Nevertheless, in the last twenty years a sort of new consensus on the conceptual 
tools to be employed to conduct valid research on fascism and the radical right started to 
take shape within the academic community. Specifically, two key ideas which developed 
independently are gradually winning historians’ approval since the early 1990s: the 
notion of “political religion”, and a specific formulation of the “generic fascism” model. 
A range of new political and cultural experiences which surfaced in the last two 
and an half centuries were occasionally classified as “civil religion”, “secular religion”, 
or “political religion”, at least since the French Revolution. However, until recent times, 
these expressions were not defined in a sufficiently sophisticated and effective way. 
Indeed, a variety of intellectuals and opinion makers used them to refer to aspects of 
modernity that extended from the conceptions of citizenship and society on which the 
United States constructed its identity, to the extreme forms of religious language used in 
the modern-day political scene, for example by fundamentalist terrorism.19 An early, 
more precise characterization of “political religion” emerged in the 1930s, when some 
                                                 
18 A concise and up-to-date introduction to the main traits of Fascism and its interpretations is Tracey A. 
Pepper, “Fascism,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 2nd ed. Ed. by William A. Darity 
Jr., vol. 3 (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2008), 102-105. 
19 Emilio Gentile, “Political Religion: A Concept and its Critics – A Critical Survey,” Totalitarian 
Movements and Political Religions 6, no. 1 (2005), 19-25. 
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Christian antifascist intellectuals, such as Frederick Voigt and Luigi Sturzo, reintroduced 
it 
to define the absolute exaltation of the party and of the state, the cult of the 
leader, mass fanaticism, rites and symbols of collective liturgies, which 
were fundamental aspects of the new totalitarian regimes. […] For these 
scholars political religion was not just a residual of ancient pagan 
religiousness, nor a phenomenon which could be traced back to the most 
remote epochs [...], but it was a consequence of modernity and of 
secularisation. It was connected to mass society, to the decline of 
traditional religions, to the spreading of irrationalism and activism, to the 
expansion of bureaucratic power of the state, to the ‘new 
Machiavellianism’ of totalitarian leaders and parties, who made use of 
fanaticism of the mass to impose their tyranny.20 
 
After four decades in which the notion of “political religion” had not played a 
significant role in scholarly work on Fascism, two crucial elements of this early definition 
were reclaimed by the Italian historian Emilio Gentile in the late 1980s in order to mold a 
new interpretative tool: that is, the profound connection between “political religion” and 
both totalitarianism and modernity.21 Indeed, during the twentieth century, in particular in 
its first half, some movements, distributed on a broad spectrum of political positions, had 
“acquired the aura of sacredness up to the point of asserting, in an exclusive and complete 
way […] the prerogative to define the ultimate meaning and the fundamental goal of 
human existence on earth.”22 This novel pretension defines the very nucleus of the idea of 
totalitarianism, whose meaning includes the aim not only of wielding a “total” control 
over institutions and people’s public life, but also of penetrating into consciences and 
                                                 
20 Gentile, 25. 
21 Gentile, 27-28. 
22 Gentile, 29. 
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imposing specific worldviews and values.23 Second, this formulation also contributes to 
the debate on modernity, in particular because it contradicts 
the theory of secularisation intended as an irreversible process of the 
‘disenchantment of the world’, accompanied by the progressive 
disappearance of the sacred in modern society along with the withdrawal 
of religion from within the private sphere. [… On the contrary, we 
witnessed] a ‘metamorphosis of the sacred’, that is, the rise in modern 
societies, even the most advanced, of new forms of sacralisation, 
independent from traditional religions.24 
 
Parallel to the development of the interpretational category of “political religion”, 
the notion of “generic fascism” was taking shape in the lively British field of fascist 
studies. After gathering and revising the chief theoretical contributions of several 
scholars, dating back at least to the pioneering studies on fascist ideology which George 
Mosse conducted in the 1960s,25 during the last decade the British historian Roger Griffin 
firmly established a new consciousness of the fact that culture and ideas, not policies and 
outward appearance, better define fascism, especially when the complex task of 
identifying its applicability to doctrines and movements materialized outside Italy and 
Germany is at stake.26 Firstly, Griffin rejects the superficial, empirical approach that 
consists in compiling “a discursive check-list of characteristics” to expand or reduce the 
label of fascism. Similarly, the British historian contests Marxist and neo-Marxist 
conceptions of the phenomenon as “an exhibition of capitalism’s ruthless survival 
                                                 
23 Peter Baehr, “Totalitarianism,” in New Dictionary of the History of Ideas. Ed. by Maryanne Cline 
Horowitz, vol. 2 (Detroit: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2005), 2342-2348. 
24 Gentile, 30-31. 
25 The crucial text in this respects is George L. Mosse, “Introduction: The Genesis of Fascism,” Journal of 
Contemporary History 1, no. 1 (1966): 14-26. 
26 Critics and detractors, like the Australian scholar Richard J.B. Bosworth, defined this shift “culturalism”, 
or “culturalist turn”, insinuating an evident, pejorative equation with “postmodernism” and the “linguistic 
turn”.  See Richard J.B. Bosworth, The Italian Dictatorship. Problems and Perspectives in the 
Interpretation of Mussolini and Fascism (London; New York: Arnold, 1998), 226-229. 
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instinct” in the face of its irreversible historical crisis.27 The second step, in view of the 
limits shown by both too simplistic and too ideological models, lies in isolating a “fascist 
minimum”, a core element that could define the cultural basis on which fascism 
developed in its varieties, accepting the fact “that fascism is externalized itself in a wide 
range of specific manifestations shaped by particular conjunctures of historical forces.”28 
Griffin successfully identified the heart of fascism in the idea of “palingenesis”, that is 
the necessity, for human society, of a “rebirth”, of a radical change that primarily applies 
to ethics and only subsequently, as a consequence, to other spheres of public life, such as 
economy and politics. More specifically, Griffin molded the definition of “generic 
fascism” – a general category that is applicable in diverse regions and epochs – as a 
“palingenetic populist ultra-nationalism”. The term “ultra-nationalism” refers to the idea 
that the fundamental identity and sense of belonging of human beings lie in a specific 
national community; within the borders of this last, a charismatic leader directly appeals 
to the masses and constructs a personality cult – notion of “populism” – in order to 
achieve a deep spiritual and cultural renewal – “palingenesis” – and, trough that, a “new” 
man and a “new” civilization. Historically, the conjuncture of those three elements started 
with “the widespread obsession in fin-de-siècle Europe with the degeneracy of liberal 
civilization and its urgent need for moral regeneration.”29 
In conclusion, two important aspects of these theoretical advances in the field of 
fascist studies should be highlighted. First, relevance and, especially, reciprocal 
                                                 
27 Roger Griffin. “The Primacy of Culture: The Current Growth (or Manufacture) of Consensus within 
Fascist Studies,” Journal of Contemporary History 37, no. 1 (2002), 22. See also p. 26-29 for Griffin’s 
cogent argumentation about the implicit, sometimes unconscious, acceptance of the emphasis on culture in 
the recent works of some important historians who are doubtful about, or critical of, this new approach. 
28 Roger Griffin, “Fascism,” in New Dictionary of the History of Ideas. Edited by Maryanne Cline 
Horowitz, vol. 2 (Detroit: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2005), 798. 
29 Griffin, “Fascism,” 795. See also p. 798 and Roger Griffin, International Fascism: Theories, Causes and 
the New Consensus (London: Arnold, 1998), 12-15. 
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compatibility between the concepts of “political religion” and “generic fascism” as a 
“palingenetic populist ultra-nationalism” were recognized by their fathers, Emilio 
Gentile30 and Roger Griffin, respectively. The latter clearly stated that his 
interpretation is fully consistent with recent theories of totalitarianism that 
place an emphasis on its bid to bring about an anthropological revolution, 
and on seeing the political religion that it institutes not as an exercise in 
collective brainwashing but as a means to transform society’s political and 
moral culture.31 
 
Second, Griffin himself emphasized the fact that the concept of “generic fascism”, 
as he uses it in academic research, “is not a reified ‘essence’, but an ideal type with a 
purely heuristic function.”32 This distinction is particularly significant for my purpose, 
since it also entails a method and a scope that significantly differ from other uses of the 
label “fascism” in cases like the Partido Nacionalista de Puerto Rico and the Ação 
Integralista Brasileira, that is, when the analysis concerns figures, organizations, and 
ideas that one does not commonly associate with fascism. I do not intend to unveil hidden 
connections, or direct processes of imitation, between the movements under consideration 
and hypothetical European counterparts, although some historical evidence is available.33 
Neither do I try to disqualify the ideologists of the PNPR and the AIB linking them with 
such a discredited term like fascism. For my purpose, “political religion” and “generic 
                                                 
30 Gentile, 28. 
31 Griffin, “Fascism,” 800. 
32 Griffin, “The Primacy of Culture,” 37. 
33 In the case of the PNPR, for example, its youth paramilitary organization, the Cadetes de la República, 
was constructed between 1931 and 1933 according to the same principles of the Italian Avanguardisti and 
Balilla corps, whose statute was translated into Spanish and published on the PNPR’s newspaper La 
Nación in December 1931 (see Ferrao, Pedro Albizu Campos y el nacionalismo puertorriqueño, 311-321). 
The AIB, on the other hand, from January 1937 to January 1938 was secretly funded by fascist Italy 
through its consulate in São Paulo, with the aim of facilitating the takeover of Salgado’s faction and the 
institution of a friendly regime in Brazil. This experiment in subversive diplomacy is explored in Angelo 
Trento, “Relações entre fascismo e integralismo: o ponto-de-vista do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros 
Italiano,” Ciencia e Cultura 34, no. 12 (1982), 1601-1613; Ricardo Antônio Silva Seitenfus, “Ideology and 
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fascism” are conceptual tools to read and interpret the subjects of my study in a new 
light. I expect, in this way, to highlight the density and complexity of the ideological 
apparatus that substantiates 1930s Puerto Rican Nationalism and Brazilian Integralism, 
and to show that those are two specific varieties of a much broader cultural and political 
trend that involved a substantial portion of the world at that time. Thanks to the 
comparative approach, I will hopefully be able to show how even radical nationalist 
phenomena could be better understood if observed also from the outside of national 
borders. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
PUERTO RICO AND BRAZIL IN THE LATIN AMERICAN AND 
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT OF THE 1930S 
 
The 1930s decade is commonly defined as an era of deep and widespread crisis 
that affected all the spheres of social life and produced drastic changes in both domestic 
and international politics. The discourses on the crisis and its solutions constitute the 
linchpin of Albizu and Salgado’s thought, and their movements developed and enjoyed 
some popular approval also thanks to local consequences of the international situation. 
Therefore, it is advisable to briefly present the main characteristics of the turbulence and 
transformations that occurred during this period, starting with a general overview of 
world history, then outlining the overall conditions in Latin America, and finally focusing 
on the two cases under examination, Puerto Rico and Brazil, in order to portray and 
contextualize the trajectory of the PNPR and the AIB over the decade. 
A central event of this problematic phase undoubtedly was the so called Great 
Depression. The instability and frailty of the financial and economic international system 
appeared clear after the New York stock market crash in October 1929, with damaging 
and sudden effects on prices, credit, employment, production, and trade. Nevertheless, 
the origins of this world recession should be traced back to the policies implemented in 
Europe and the United States after the First World War. In the belief that the wounds 
provoked by the most destructive conflict in human history could have been healed 
through the circulation of capital and commodities, the governments of Great Britain and 
the United States, with the active support of London and New York bankers and 
 18
financiers, promoted a reopening of world markets, after the phase of protectionism and 
autarchy required by the war. During the 1920s, the recovery of the European economy 
was fueled by British and U.S. capital, and tariffs on imports and exports were held 
down. However, some elements of serious instability remained, such as the unsolved 
dispute between Germany and France on war reparations, and new ones emerged. In 
particular, the reintroduction of the gold standard by the British government, in 1925, 
made the pound sterling the currency of reference for the international system, although 
the country lacked a healthy economy to support it. Moreover, in the United States 
inexpensive credit led to excessively high debt levels, which coupled with the huge loans 
given to European countries, fueling personal, business and banks’ defaults and, finally, 
the Wall Street crash itself.34  
Some political reactions to the 1929 financial collapse, that could have probably 
been contained, aggravated the situation, extending the crisis to the entire world 
economic system. The single most influential decision was the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, 
passed by the U.S. Congress on June 17, 1930, by which tariffs on imports were 
unilaterally raised with the goal to stimulate domestic production and commerce. 
Although the actual increases in duty rates was not large, the immediate result was the 
retaliation of other governments, in Europe and elsewhere, that also hiked tariffs and 
started a trend toward protectionist measures. The natural consequence was a rapid and 
substantial decrease of international trade: comparing 1932 to 1929, the value of the 
commercialized products in the world market dropped by 39%, the volume of exports 
                                                 
34 Robert D. Boyce, “Why International Finance Mattered: 1919-1939,” in A Companion to International 
History 1900-2001, ed. Gordon Martel (Malden, MA; Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), available from 
Blackwell Reference Online, 
<http://www.blackwellreference.com/subscriber/tocnode?id=g9781405125741_chunk_g978140512574115
> (accessed 24 September 2008). 
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was reduced by 74%, and export prices fell by 52%.35 Furthermore, that reversal in 
general attitude toward economics also entailed, over the 1930s, an expansion of state 
participation in economy and society, and different governmental measures to fight 
poverty and protect workers: that is the case, for example, of the British unemployment 
benefit system implemented in 1931, of French 1936 employment legislation, and of 
Roosevelt’s New Deal in the United States. Nevertheless, state interventionism also took 
more authoritarian forms: the nationalist and autarchic model represented by fascist Italy, 
where Mussolini’s regime was able, to a certain extent, to protect the country from the 
global crisis, excited admiration in several circles, in Europe and elsewhere. Where the 
severe effects of the economic depression coupled with expansionist tendencies and a 
widespread sense of humiliation for the defeat in the Great War and the new order 
established by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, the idea of a strong, regulating and 
militaristic state found acceptance: that is obviously the case of the rise to power of 
Hitler’s National Socialism in Germany, but also, to a lesser degree, of some 
dictatorships in Eastern Europe and of imperial Japan.36 
Another crucial destabilizing factor was the diffusion of communism. After the 
1917 Russian Revolution and the consolidation of the Soviet Union in 1922, Communist 
parties were created all over the world and found in Lenin’s Third International a strict 
coordinating authority that set standard programs and policies for the local branches. The 
threat of a socialist revolution played a capital role in the mobilization of the masses by 
                                                 
35 Charles H. Feinstein, Peter Temin, and Gianni Toniolo, The World Economy between the World Wars 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 94. 
36 Antony Best and others, International History of the Twentieth Century (London; New York: Routledge, 
2004) is a reliable overview of the surfacing of aggressive nationalisms in Asia (p. 58-79) and Europe (p. 
152-184) on the eve of the Second World War. The best and most accessible picture of European varieties 
of fascism, with considerable attention for comparison and international connections, is Philip Morgan, 
Fascism in Europe, 1919-1945 (London; New York: Routledge, 2003). 
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conservative elites and nationalist bourgeoisie, contributing to the general trend toward 
radicalization of politics that the consequences of the financial and economic crisis 
aggravated.37 The Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), fought between Franco’s Christian 
nationalists and a heterogeneous coalition of communists, socialists, anarchists, and 
liberals, was only the most prominent and intense of the internecine political struggles 
which broke out in numerous countries during the decade. It became a transnational 
emblem of the destructive power of conflicting ideologies and anticipated, in terms of 
brutality and complexity, the imminent Second World War.38 
The economic depression and the political instability of the 1930s had serious 
repercussions also on Latin America. During the 19th century, and particularly in its final 
decades, the subcontinent was increasingly integrated into the international trade and 
financial market. In general terms, Spanish America and Brazil produced and exported 
raw materials – mainly agricultural and farm produce, and mineral ores – in exchange for 
finished products and capital investments from developed economies, especially Great 
Britain and, increasingly, the United States. This dynamic surely contributed to a gradual 
process of modernization and economic growth in the Latin American nations, but also 
exposed the latter to a hazardous dependency on the trends of European and North 
American economy. During the years of the First World War, for example, the inevitable 
decrease in the volumes of international trade caused by the conflict critically damaged 
                                                 
37 Matthew Worley, ed., In Search of Revolution: International Communist Parties in the Third Period 
(London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004) presents a variety of essays on the communist movements all over 
the world during the 1930s, including Brazil (Marco Santana, “Moscow in the Tropics: The Third Period, 
Brazilian Style,” 360-372). The introductory chapter (Matthew Worley, “Courting Disaster? The 
Communist International in the Third Period,” 1-17) provides an overview of the Third International’s 
positions and policies in the face of the world depression. 
38 A brief but complete overview of this crucial conflict is Helen Graham, The Spanish Civil War: A Very 
Short Introduction (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). A recent work that treats the topic 
from a diplomatic history perspective and emphasizes its transnational significance is Michael Alpert, A 
New International History of the Spanish Civil War, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 
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Latin American countries, which only in part capitalized on that situation promoting 
import substitution through domestic industrial production. Latin America participated in 
the liberalization wave of markets promoted after the war by the winning powers, and 
during the 1920s the trend toward the consolidation of the role of the United States, in 
commercial relations and as provider of capitals, strengthened, with the concurrent 
weakening of the British position. As a matter of fact, “between 1913 and 1929 U.S. 
imports from Latin America rose by 110.6 percent, while, Latin American imports from 
the United States rose by 161.2 percent.” Moreover, in 1929 the value of U.S. 
investments in the region was more than three times that of 1914.39 Not surprisingly, due 
to this integration in a dependent position, Latin America was dragged into the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, experiencing an abrupt cut in foreign investment, a collapse in 
trade volumes, and a drop in the price of commodities, which in 1932 had collapsed to a 
36 percent of those that were effective in 1928:40 as a consequence, income and 
governmental budget contracted. The new protectionist policies implemented in the 
United States and in Europe evidently impaired recovery in the subcontinent, whose 
financial stability and economic fortunes mainly depended on exports. 
The failure of the liberal exchange model prompted important political changes. 
In different circles, new modernizing projects were elaborated around the key ideas of 
industrialization with support of the state and protection from foreign competition, 
cooperation among classes, infrastructural investments, and a more efficient political 
system. Since the 1930s, several Latin American nations – and, among them, the biggest 
                                                 
39 Victor Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History of Latin America since Independence (Cambridge, UK; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 157 (note 17) and 158 (table 6.2). 
40 Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History of Latin America, 192 (table 7.2). See the entire chapter on the 
1930s, p. 189-231. 
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three, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico – experienced different versions of those innovative 
endeavors, generally categorized under the label of populism, because of the leading role 
of a charismatic figure in reshaping economy, society, and politics. Developments plans 
were generally accompanied by nationalist and anti-communist rhetoric and policies: the 
goal of contrasting the attraction held by socialist, internationalist ideas on the emerging 
urban working class, for example, explains the realization of embryonic forms of welfare 
and employment legislation.41 
The de facto integration to U.S. economy of Latin American countries’ productive 
systems was formalized in the case of Puerto Rico.42 After its annexation to the United 
States as a result of the 1898 Spanish-American War, the island experienced a new 
colonial rule that made it unique. The civil government created in 1900 with the Foraker 
Act established the institutional framework that, with some minor adjustments, 
characterized the administration of Puerto Rico until the late 1940s: although Puerto 
Ricans could elect a legislative assembly, the key position of governor was assigned by 
U.S. authorities, who also appointed the members of judicial power. The occupation 
brought economic and infrastructural advancements, but the weak productive system of 
the island was rapidly converted to sugar cane monoculture, under the control of big U.S. 
companies and completely dependent on the trends of the U.S. market. Although 
education benefited from more investments, English was imposed as the teaching 
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language, as well as the official administrative tongue, provoking widespread discontent. 
Local elites, although not close-knit, for different reasons accepted, or even supported, 
U.S. rule: during the first two decades of the century, what was called nacionalismo 
cultural,43 or nacionalismo moderado,44 prevailed. Puerto Rican intellectuals and 
politicians, moving with different nuances into a liberal and reformist framework, 
considered U.S. occupation as an opportunity for the material and cultural progress of the 
island, into a dynamic of benign influence by a developed, modern civilization on a 
backward, traditional society. The breaking of this generalized consensus only occurred 
in the 1930s, and the Partido Nacionalista de Puerto Rico (PNPR) led by Pedro Albizu 
Campos was the main agent of this change. 
The PNPR45 was founded on September 17, 1922 by the fusion of three pro-
independence associations under the leadership of José Coll Cuchí. The establishment of 
this new organization was the consequence of two main events, occurred at the beginning 
of the decade, that reawaken the independence cause. Firstly, in 1921 the new governor 
Emmet Montgomery Reilly started to openly back the process of forced 
“Americanization” of the island, and to demonstrate hostility toward the participation of 
the local political elite in the administration of the island. Secondly, in 1922 the major 
Puerto Rican party, the Partido Unión, proposed for the first time the formula of the 
Estado Libre Asociado – an autonomous state subordinate to the U.S. control – as a 
viable option to solve the uncertainty of the political status. Nevertheless, the PNPR was 
more “un club cultural semiprivado integrado básicamente por profesionales y hombres 
                                                 
43 Ferrao, Pedro Albizu Campos y el nacionalismo puertorriqueño. 
44 Rodríguez Vázquez, El sueño que no cesa. 
45 The best presentations of the trajectory of the PNPR are Ferrao, Pedro Albizu Campos y el nacionalismo 
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de letras,”46 than a real political actor: it quietly defended the idea of Puerto Rican 
nationhood without investing any energy in recruitments and campaigns, and obtaining 
just a few hundreds of votes in the legislative elections held in 1924 and 1928. 
Meanwhile, in 1924, a young, brilliant lawyer had entered the party, after a brief 
disappointing experience in the Partido Unión: Pedro Albizu Campos.47 Born in Ponce in 
1891, Albizu was the illegitimate mulatto son of a black, illiterate field hand woman and 
of an employee of the U.S. customs, who came from a poor landed family that had 
escaped from Venezuela at the time of independence.48 Thanks to a scholarship awarded 
by the Masonic lodge of his hometown, in 1912 Albizu was able to start his higher 
education at the University of Vermont and, one year later, to transfer to Harvard 
University. In Boston, Albizu was in close contact with intellectuals and groups which 
supported Irish and Indian independence, and also volunteered in the First World War as 
a Lieutenant in the U.S. Army (1917-1919). After his graduation in law in 1921, he 
decided to come back to his motherland and got involved in active politics. Considering 
the Partido Unión too moderate and connected to the colonial power, Albizu joined the 
PNPR in 1924, starting a career that took him, in the same year, to the vice-presidency of 
the organization and, between 1927 and 1930, to be the official Nationalist representative 
in a propaganda journey through the Caribbean and Latin America.49 
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When Albizu landed in Puerto Rico, in January 1930, a conflict with the 
leadership of Coll Cuchí, already maturing when he was abroad, exploded, determining a 
dramatic shift in the role of the PNPR on the political scene. Albizu was elected president 
of the party in May 1930 and, with a group of loyal followers, immediately started a 
campaign for independence and against the United States. Forceful and virulent 
propaganda brought the Nationalist cause to the forefront and apparently won the support 
of a considerable sector of the Puerto Rican working class. Nevertheless, it also caused a 
decade-long hemorrhage of militants, including Coll Cuchí and other leaders, who 
disagreed with this new aggressive and intolerant standpoint. A number of factors 
induced the Nationalist leadership to further radicalization. First of all, the dramatic 
consequences of the collapse of the international price and demand of sugar, provoked by 
depression, produced a wave of popular discontent and protests, which were also excited 
by the authoritarian and militarist turn of the colonial administration operated by two new 
U.S. officers: in October 1933, Col. Francis Elisha Riggs became the head of the colonial 
police, and, in January 1934, Gen. Blanton Winship took office as governor. Moreover, 
the elections held in November 1932 were a failure for the PNPR that only won a 1.37 % 
of the poll. As a result of those events, Albizu and the ruling group of the party decided to 
boycott the 1936 elections and to accept the use violence, although not overtly, as a 
means of political struggle. 
The movement was gradually militarized, in preparation of an insurrection, and a 
paramilitary youth organization, the Cadetes de la República, was formed, causing 
bloody confrontations with the police. The escalation of violence led, on February 23, 
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1936, to the assassination of Col. Riggs by two nationalists, who were killed by the police 
after their arrest. Authorities considered the leadership of the PNPR responsible for the 
disorders, and in March Albizu and other seven leaders of the movement were formally 
charged with conspiracy. After a controversial trial, on July 31, they were sentenced by a 
jury composed in its majority by Americans, were imprisoned in San Juan and, later, 
transferred to Atlanta, Georgia. Initially, the arrest of the party leadership did not stop 
Nationalist activities: nevertheless, the seventeen pro-independence demonstrators killed 
by the police on March 21, 1937, in what was called the Ponce massacre, constituted a 
trauma that, together with the internal rivalry of the leadership and the successive 
outbreak of the Second World War, further undermined the Nationalist cause. Pedro 
Albizu Campos completed his jail sentence in 1947 and returned to Puerto Rico, already 
in a poor state of health. Nationalist insurrections in 1950 and 1954 caused him a new 
detainment with an eighty-year prison sentence. In 1956 he suffered a thrombosis that 
gradually rendered him mute and semi-paralyzed and, a few months after being pardoned, 
on April 21, 1965, passed away, having spent more than twenty-four of the last thirty 
years of his life jailed or in a prison hospital. 
The integration into the international economic system in a dependent position 
also characterized a country of continental dimensions and with a consolidated 
independence status such as Brazil. During the four decades of the so called First 
Republic (1889-1930),50 the former Portuguese colony was governed according to the 
federalist and presidential system that the 1891 Constitution sanctioned after the 
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overthrow of the Empire. Real power was distributed according to the economic weight 
of the states of the union, and the agro-exporting model based on the massive production 
of coffee favored the emergence of the elites of São Paulo and Minas Gerais, who during 
the entire period shared the majority of the executive positions, beginning with the 
presidency. The ruling class of less powerful states, and local influential groups in 
general, usually exchanged their allegiance to the central government for the maintenance 
of status quo in the periphery, where a mixture of paternalism and violence assured order. 
Indeed, the vast majority of the population was excluded from suffrage, and state 
republican parties, although ideologically feeble and uncoordinated, easily controlled 
both the local and the national votes. 
The oligarchic system started to show its fragility in the early 1920s, when 
discontent for its conservatism and lack of initiative produced both an electoral alliance 
of middleweight states’ elites, that was defeated in the 1922 elections, and a series of 
military upheavals. Middle-ranking officers from the middle class and with an over the 
average cultural and technical formation were the protagonists of this ferment. The so 
called tenentismo advocated a progressive and modernizing platform, and a political role 
for the military that in Brazil, historically, had not been substantial. The insurrections that 
took place during the decade were always successfully repressed by the loyalist forces, 
but contributed to further erode the basis of the First Republic. A combination of factors, 
including the collapse of the price of coffee on international markets after the beginning 
of the crisis in 1929, and the alienation of the Minas Gerais’ elite from the majority, 
rendered the 1930 presidential elections a turning point. The candidate from São Paulo, 
Júlio Prestes, won, but the opposing coalition, under the leadership of the defeated 
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contender, Getúlio Vargas, revolted after some months of hesitation. What became 
known as the 1930 Revolution lasted a month, from October 3 to November 4, and 
removed from national supremacy the traditional oligarchy.51 Since the sponsors of the 
insurrection were, to a large extent, former members of the governmental circles, as 
Getúlio Vargas himself, the regime change initially did not entail radical transformations, 
also because the heterogeneous alliance lacked a specific, alternative program. As a 
matter of fact, at the local level, power relations were left untouched. Nevertheless, the 
events of 1930 brought to power Getúlio Vargas, who, mainly thanks to his political 
acuity and his talents as a mediator of interest groups, was destined to remain on the 
Brazilian political scene for a quarter century.52 
During the first two years after the revolution (1931-1932), Vargas governed 
Brazil as provisional president, concentrating in his hands both the executive and the 
legislative powers: the parliament, indeed, was dissolved, and the 1891 Constitution 
suspended. However, a contrast emerged between two different constituents of the new 
ruling class: on the one hand, the inheritors of the 1920s tenentismo, who favored radical 
reforms under an authoritarian and centralizing regime; on the other hand, elements of the 
old oligarchies, particularly from São Paulo, that had lost its centrality and, as the other 
states, was now administered by an interventor, that is, an official appointed by the 
president. Although Vargas, in early 1932, decreed an electoral reform, conceding 
women’s suffrage, and called elections for a constituent assembly, in July the opposition 
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mobilized the population of São Paulo against the government, in what was called the 
Constitutionalist, or Paulista, Revolution. A regional insurrection that also promoted 
separatist projects was not able to arouse sympathies from other states, and since Vargas 
maintained the support of the military, governmental repression was successful.53 
The failure of the armed struggle against the provisional structure of power that 
was established after the 1930 Revolution opened, in compliance with a specific design 
by Vargas, a new stage of cooperation among diverse interest groups in search for a 
compromise. This purpose was accomplished in the assembly elected in 1933 and, 
especially, in the 1934 Constitution. The new charter combined some elements of the 
liberal and republican traditions – such as the declaration of citizens rights and the federal 
system – with key requests coming from nationalist reformists, like an embryonic 
employment legislation, public education, state control over water and mineral resources, 
and the representation of professional categories in the congress, according to a sort of 
rough corporatist project. More importantly, Vargas obtained from the constituent 
assembly, after its transformation into the transitory national parliament, a legitimate, 
four-year presidential term, starting in July 1934. Through his indefatigable policy of 
negotiation and compromise, Getúlio Vargas achieved his main goal: to hold power, 
independently of the changing political balances and institutional arrangements.54 
The Constitutionalist Revolution of 1932 played a crucial role also in the life of 
Plínio Salgado (1895-1975) and in the formation of the Integralist movement. Plínio 
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Salgado55 was born in 1895 to a traditional, conservative family in São Bento do Sapucaí, 
São Paulo. He was largely self-taught with little formal education. After his father’s death 
in 1911, Salgado worked as school teacher and journalist. As a consequence of the 
sudden death of his wife, in 1918, he embraced a spiritualist Christian faith and, two 
years later, moved to São Paulo, where he started contributing to the Correio Paulistano, 
the official organ of the oligarchic Partido Republicano Paulista (PRP). His move to the 
state capital marked the beginning of a rather contradictory cultural and political 
trajectory, that lasted more than a decade. In fact, he participated in the renowned 
Semana de Arte Moderna, in 1922, that was the founding moment of Brazilian 
Modernism in literature and art. In 1926 he published with success his first novel, O 
estrangeiro, in which the corruption of the oligarchic system was opposed to the 
authenticity and the spontaneous nationalism of the rural people. In spite of his activism 
in nationalist and indigenista movements, in 1928 he took a seat in the state parliament 
for the PRP and supported the governmental candidate Júlio Prestes against Getúlio 
Vargas in the 1930 presidential elections. During that crucial year for the history of 
Brazil, Salgado left for a long journey through Europe and the Middle East, that he would 
later consider decisive for the incubation of his political project.56 Returning to Brazil in 
the middle of the insurrection, Salgado initially defended the First Republic against what 
he considered just another version of decadent liberalism, but, after the victory of the 
revolutionary movement, he started cooperating with tenentista circles and opposing the 
constitutionalist faction. In 1931 he published the Manifesto da Legião Revolucionária, 
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56 Plínio Salgado, Despertemos a Nação! (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1935), 15-17. This passage will be 
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in which he proposed the construction of an authoritarian, centralized, and nationalist 
state, and participated in the foundation of a newspaper, A Razão, that became the main 
mouthpiece in São Paulo for the provisional government, against the restoration of the 
republican oligarchy. Finally, in February 1932, Salgado constituted the Sociedade de 
Estudos Políticos, that united anti-liberal young people and intellectuals who favored the 
adoption by the provisional government of a political doctrine inspired by European 
fascism and authoritarian nationalism. On the eve of the Constitutionalist Revolution, the 
headquarters of the political organization were attacked and burned, and Salgado, who 
had already written the foundational manifesto of the Ação Integralista Brasileira (AIB) 
had to await the resolution of the conflict to launch his new movement. 
The AIB57 was eventually founded in São Paulo, on October 7, 1932, and during 
1933 undertook the work of propaganda and proselytism in the entire Brazilian territory: 
it was, indeed, only the second party in the history of the country to present itself as a 
national political organization, after the establishment of the Communist Party of Brazil 
in 1922. In 1934 – the year of the First Integralist Congress in Vitória, Espirito Santo – 
the AIB acquired a more structured organization, that was inspired by hierarchical and 
militarist principles, prefiguring the future Integralist State. Plínio Salgado, as the Chefe 
Nacional (“National Leader”), indisputable and perpetual, was assisted by an advisory 
body and by secretaries of departments that were patterned on governmental ministries. 
Later, in 1936, other collective organisms were created, as an embryonic stage toward the 
construction of corporatist institutions. Again in 1934, official party magazines and 
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newspapers started to be published, and a formal Milícia Integralista was created. During 
the demonstrations promoted by the latter, several episodes of bloody confrontation with 
the newly formed Aliança Nacional Libertadora (ANL)58 – a motley progressive, anti-
Vargas coalition of communists, socialists, Catholics, and liberals – contributed to the 
rising atmosphere of turmoil and violence, but also to the popular success of the AIB: in 
late 1935 there were over a thousand of local branches and about 400,000 militants, and 
the party was able to elect some state-level representatives.59 The disastrous coup against 
Vargas that the ANL attempted in November 1935 strengthened the anti-communist 
militancy in the country, and brought to the AIB further approval. With a view to the 
1938 presidential elections, in 1936 Salgado decided to prepare his candidacy with mass 
rallies, with an ambiguous attitude toward the incumbent government, that in some cases 
prohibited Integralist meetings and arrested activists. Vargas was indeed planning the 
extension of his presidency beyond the constitutional term accorded to him in 1934: to 
this end, he ably emphasized the menace posed by extremisms – especially by the left, 
but also by the AIB – to maintain the support of the public opinion and, more 
importantly, of the armed forces. A few months before the planned elections, on 
November 10, 1937, Vargas carried out a coup that established a new authoritarian and 
populist regime that was called Estado Novo.60 Salgado initially accepted the new system 
of government, in the hope of preserving his organization, but, when in December all 
political parties were disbanded and his efforts to mediate with Vargas failed, 
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conspiratorial plans started to be arranged. The uprising took place in May 1938, but was 
a complete failure, because of organizational mistakes and lack of militants. The 
authorities definitively dismantled the clandestine AIB and Salgado, after two brief 
imprisonments, in May 1939 launched an appeal to his former comrades to avoid any 
anti-governmental activity: eventually, in June went into exile to Lisbon. Salgado 
returned to Brazil in 1945, at the beginning of the redemocratization process, and 
founded a new party, the Partido de Representação Popular (PRP), in which he rehashed 
the original Integralist doctrine. This minor movement lasted, without significant 
successes, until 1965, when the newborn military dictatorship, that Salgado supported, 
dissolved all Brazilian parties. Salgado sat in the congress for the ARENA – the pro-
dictatorship coalition – until 1974, just one year before his death, in December 1975.61 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
DISCOURSES ON THE CRISIS 
 
When comparing Pedro Albizu Campos and Plínio Salgado, the latter indubitably 
has the most refined philosophical and historical justification for his revolutionary and 
nationalist political platform. Salgado, a very prolific writer,62 devoted hundreds of pages 
to describing and analyzing what he considered a world that was falling into ruin, with a 
global outlook that Albizu does not show. Nevertheless, the radical criticism toward the 
United States that the Puerto Rican politician maintains in his speeches and articles is 
built on a similar apocalyptic view of the present: a present that, in both authors, is 
described as the result of specific dynamics of the past, and is conceived as the battlefield 
on which a precise idea of the future must be formulated and affirmed. 
The spiritual impoverishment of the human being is the starting point of  
Salgado’s reflections on the present condition of humanity. 
O mundo está morrendo pela ausência do “espírito”. 
Ausência do “espírito”... 
Como é fácil e, ao mesmo tempo, difícil compreender o que seja o 
“espírito”! É preciso ter uma noção integral da própria criatura humana. E 
a Humanidade de hoje perdeu completamente o senso da personalidade, o 
sentido das proporções e dos limites, a percepção da harmonia das formas, 
a intuição dos equilíbrios exatos, o sentimento das euforias perfeitas.63 
 
This passage, among other things, demonstrates that the Brazilian intellectual did 
not build his discourse on a negative anthropology of man. In fact, he states that modern-
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day disequilibrium and disharmony are not a consequence of an evil nature of the human 
beings, but of a perdida, a loss that, by definition, must have took place in specific 
historical moments. In other words, the “ausência do ‘espírito’” is the product of 
identifiable historical processes that the author does not hesitate to pinpoint. The first one 
lies within the realm of politics and ethics, and has a precise origin: the French 
Revolution. 
Desde a Revolução Francesa, outro não tem sido o grito da humanidade 
senão aquele que atroou todos os recantos do mundo e do século: 
- Liberdade! Liberdade!64 
 
The idea of freedom, in Salgado’s opinion, extended its ominous influence well 
beyond the area of political rights and institutional reforms. In the first instance, “a 
liberdade política transformou-se em liberdade moral e essa criou a liberdade dos 
instintos.”65 This negative form of freedom that liberalism produced, constitutes a 
deception for the modern man, who indeed, “quando se julgou livre, estava escravo.”66 
Salgado insists on the paradox of an illusory emancipation that, through “a morte da 
disciplina,”67 engenders a new, moral slavery. In fact, two traditional institutions that 
guaranteed the smooth functioning of both private and social life are now dismantled. 
Salgado writes: 
Não admira que se afirme que a moral é um ponto de vista. Não admira 
que se dê hoje ao amor entre homem e a mulher uma finalidade puramente 
egoísta.[...] Nem, ainda, que se persigam as religiões em nome da 
liberdade. [...] Que se atente contra a afirmação integral do amor entre o 
homem e a mulher, em nome da liberdade do prazer.68 
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Modernity cancelled out the two pillars of family and religion by means of a 
misunderstood conception of freedom that leads to an unrestrained pursuit of pleasures 
and to a proliferation of vices. As a consequence, the organization of the Integralist 
movement would be grounded on the imposition of a strict internal discipline that, 
according to the leader’s intentions, should have been eventually enjoined on the whole 
country: indeed, Salgado conceived the party as a model and as a prefiguration of the 
future Brazilian society to be built. Not surprisingly, family and religion will be two 
constituent elements of the trinity of values that the Integralist motto proposed since the 
foundation of the movement: Deus, Pátria, Família. 
The process of moral dissolution that the political ideas of the French Revolution 
provoked has, according to the author, another pernicious and paradoxical effect, that 
spreads from ethics and politics to the field of economics. As a matter of fact, in 
Salgado’s view, 
esse mesmo homem, que ergueu audaciosamente a cabeça para negar a 
metafísica, e substituiu a teologia pela crítica, o espiritualismo pelo 
materialismo, o sentimento da disciplina pela utilidade da disciplina, foi 
prosseguindo de tal forma que acabou por aceitar uma nova metafísica, 
[...] uma coisa tão vaga como o paraíso sonhado e uma humanidade 
mecânica.69 
 
This “new metaphysics,” this hollow materialistic faith that is leading humanity to 
perdition is nothing else that the capitalist mode of production, i.e., the economic 
counterpart of political liberalism in force in the modern world. Nevertheless, Salgado’s 
analysis drastically diverges from the Marxian one, and the following passage shows this 
substantial difference. 
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Liberdade! clamavam os patrões e, em nome da liberdade de contrato, 
passaram a explorar os pobres, e o trabalho humano transformou-se em 
mercadoria sujeita às leis da oferta e da procura. 
Liberdade! clamavam, por sua vez, os proletários, os quais, assistindo ao 
espetáculo de luxo e paganismo de seus chefes, endureceram o coração e 
lançaram-se nas tremendas lutas de classe, feitas de ódio e de revolta.70 
 
In the author’s view, modern economic inequalities and exploitation of the 
workforce produce a far more serious consequence than proletariat’s abject living 
conditions: “the hardening of the heart.” Once again, emphasis is placed on moral issues, 
and decadence, once again, is the trajectory that Salgado detects. He suggests that the 
“terrible class struggle” should not be explained as a reaction to injustice or oppression, 
but as the result of envy for masters’ wealth and of “hatred.” The nostalgia for a golden 
age of harmonic working relationships reaches its height in the description of another 
destructive element of the capitalist system: the submission of man to technology, and the 
commodification of work. 
O próprio trabalho já não é um prazer, mas um triste manobrar de 
manivelas e de alavancas, onde toda a iniciativa do Espírito desapareceu. 
[...] Não amando mais o trabalho [...]; vendo a “arte” ser substituída pela 
“técnica”; [...] o homem moderno vai-se tornando um autômato, um 
boneco em carne e osso, que será possivelmente substituído por um outro 
boneco de aço e ferro.71 
 
The concept is later reinforced in the same text. 
A redução ao inanimado. A racionalização desracionalizante. O homem-
tipo, como a máquina-tipo. O trabalho mercadoria, como o kilowatt-hora. 
O índice de calorias dos combustíveis. O trabalho como finalidade do 
trabalho. A morte total do Espirito.72 
 
The industrial revolution, Salgado says, destroyed the traditional conception of 
work as “art”, and made machines compete with humans: the higher levels of efficiency 
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and productivity of the former easily determines their “superioridade social sobre o 
homem.”73 Moreover, the reduction of man to a simple worker, treated as a 
“commodity”, erases his personality, the spiritual component to which Salgado’s message 
appeals. The author condenses this vision in a tragic, literary image, using again the 
metaphor of “heart” to formulate it: “o observador do nosso tempo conclui que a 
civilização moderna arrancou o coração do Homem e o atirou aos dentes das 
máquinas.”74 
Salgado’s worldview then is based on an utter rejection of modernity, in its 
ethical, political, and economic constituents: namely, materialism, liberalism, and 
capitalism. His harsh criticism is formulated on the basis of an idealized, although 
chronologically vague, vision of the pre-modern past, in which society was supposedly 
harmonically organized. The project of society, state, and economy that Integralism will 
offer will be presented as a recovery of this betrayed tradition, but through a novel 
doctrine formulated by an enlightened leader for a specific national community. 
Therefore, the constituents of Griffin’s “generic fascism” formula – palingenesis, 
populism, and ultra-nationalism – are here clearly at stake. 
Pedro Albizu Campos lived in a rather different context from Salgado, and this 
affected the elaboration of his thought. In the early 1930s, a serious economic and 
political instability characterized both Brazil and Puerto Rico, but the latter was subject to 
a peculiar condition: it was a colony of the United States. As a consequence, Albizu 
constructs his perspective on the crisis by means of an analytical device that is typical of 
anti-colonial discourses: a dualism between the dominant power and the subject people. 
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Albizu’s conceptualization of the two poles in dispute marked the difference between the 
temperate nationalism that prevailed in the island until the 1920s,75 and the radical one of 
the new PNPR. Specifically, as the historian Rodríguez Vázquez clearly identifies, the 
options at issue concerned a qualitative evaluation of Puerto Rico as a people and as a 
nation. 
El cambio de metrópoli [from Spain to the United Status, in 1898] 
significó una ruptura con el pasado que nos dejaba sólo ante dos posibles 
representaciones del país: la de Puerto Rico como una muchedumbre 
huérfana no constituida como pueblo o la de de la isla como una nación 
apta para los derechos y las obligaciones que conllevaban la mayoría de 
edad.76 
 
Albizu rejects the prevalent tendency, at the time, toward the vision of Puerto 
Rico as a “minor” who could have benefited from a wardship by a developed “adult” as 
the United States. On the contrary, he points out the adverse effects of the U.S. influence 
on his home country, starting his analysis, unlike Salgado, with economics and not with 
politics. The denunciation of the economic exploitation suffered by Puerto Rico under 
colonial status is the pillar of the author’s argument. In his opinion, the material benefits 
brought to the island after 1898, such as the improvements in infrastructures and some 
welfare state measures, were not comparable with the profound changes produced in the 
economic structure of the island: indeed, the occupiers favored the concentration of land 
and resources by U.S. sugar corporations, and, consequently, the development of a 
monoculture that converted Puerto Rico into a territory fully dependent from the United 
States. That iniquitous economic and financial relation is clearly exemplified, according 
to Albizu, by the trade balance figures: 
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Puerto Rico es el quinto mercado en el mundo de la gran patria de Mister 
Jorge Washington. […] El balance comercial que ha tenido Puerto Rico a 
su favor durante treinta y cinco años, asciende a un mil doscientos 
cincuenta millones en oro. […] 
¿Dónde está, señores, ese inmenso capital en oro de Puerto Rico? […] 
Bien, pues los yankis le han robado todo eso al pueblo de Puerto Rico. Lo 
tienen allá.77 
 
The obvious emblem of the unfair exploitation of Puerto Rican resources by U.S. 
capital was the sugar industry which, after 1898, expanded dramatically and dominated 
the economic and social structure of the island. Albizu shows an earnest commitment to 
change the misguided perception that Puerto Ricans shared the profits of this production 
system. 
Ellos dicen que la industria azucarera es puertorriqueña. Vamos a 
analizarlo. El sesenta por ciento de la industria azucarera es de intereses 
yankis: […] Del resto, un veinte por ciento es de intereses extranjeros que 
no son yankis: son franceses, españoles, etc. Un veinte por ciento es de 
puertorriqueños, de los cuales, quizás la mitad, están irremisiblemente 
hipotecados y un diez por ciento están solventes.78 
 
The author is quite detailed in his examination of the terrible economic 
consequences that the monoculture of sugar have on his country. He carefully analyzes, 
among others, the financial and social costs caused by the imposition of the U.S. bank 
system with unfavorable conditions for natives, the growth of debts and fiscal imposition, 
and the concurrent fall of wages and rise of the unemployment rate, in a general pattern 
of worker exploitation.79 Nevertheless, the attention that the president of the PNPR pays 
to economic factors is oriented, as in Salgado’s more general treatment of capitalism and 
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industrialization, at unfolding the disruption of previous tried and tested structures. In 
fact, the bitter opposition to the “sugar slavery” imposed by foreign investors relied, in 
Albizu’s reflections, not only on a generic sense of usurpation and divestment, but also 
on the conviction that the model of development imposed by the colonial ruler had 
drastically altered the economic and social equilibrium created under Spanish 
domination.80 The nexus between the reference to an idealized past and the formulation 
of a political program for the future is, in this case, explicit: “hay que suprimir el 
acaparamiento de esos recursos. Tenemos que distribuirlos entre nuestro pueblo. Debe 
surgir de nuevo la legión de propietarios que teníamos en 1898.”81 The myth of the 
existence of a majority of small-scale property owners when the island was controlled by 
Spain would be crucial in the formulation of the economic platform of the PNPR. 
Similar to Salgado, Albizu closely connects the economic level to the sphere of 
ethics, giving to the latter, after all, a substantial preeminence in his discourse. Therefore, 
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not only does he overtly blame the colonial status, but he also rejects the humanitarian 
reasons and the myth of prosperity that were propagandized since 1898 by the U.S. 
authorities, and widely accepted by the Puerto Rican intelligentsia, as a justification for 
the occupation. On the contrary, “en fin, la nación asintió a su desmembramiento material 
y moral, anestesiada con las supuestas buenas intenciones.”82 In a passage of one of his 
inflamed speeches, Albizu overtly formulates this close connection between material and 
moral consequences. 
En el terreno económico [the United Status] nos han llevado a la ruina con 
su obra nefasta de penetración y desplazamiento económico. Pero no es 
solamente el despojo físico sino también el despojo moral tratando de 
postergar al nativo y de someterlo por todos los medios imaginables, 
creando una casta de serviles.83 
 
Just as Salgado censures, in his philosophy of history, the Industrial Revolution 
and the commodification of human work for the moral degradation and submission to 
technology that distinguish the modern era, his Puerto Rican counterpart indicates as the 
causes of his country’s annihilation the policies of the invaders, that are passively 
accepted by the majority of the people. An exemplary case of this dynamic, in which an 
apparently positive concrete means operates as a force of subjugation is, according to 
Albizu, the extension to Puerto Rico of the welfare state measures implemented by the 
Roosevelt administration to curb the economic depression. 
Nosotros no hemos heredados aquel orgullo [of the ancestors] porque no 
tenemos razón para ser orgullosos; tenemos el deber de estar avergonzados 
porque hemos recibido una gran heredad y hoy somos mendigos, porque 
eso de la rehabilitación es reducirnos a todos a la mendicidad. Habéis 
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perdido la vergüenza cuando hacéis filas para recibir de manos de una 
muchacha un bollo de pan.84 
 
Unsurprisingly, Albziu cannot conceive of his own people accepting emergency 
relief from the colonizer instead of rising up and pursuing the only definitive solution for 
Puerto Rican problems: independence. But even more outrageous, in his view, is the fact 
that the United States finds local supporters on the island, and particularly in the 
emblematic sector of the sugar industry. 
Tropezáis con hermanos que tienen intereses y que son aliados del 
enemigo yanki; y esos hermanos nuestros en ningún sitio están mejor 
representados que en Ponce. Ponce es una zona azucarera y todo azucarero 
en Puerto Rico es enemigo de Puerto Rico, es enemigo de la 
independencia de Puerto Rico. 
[…] 
¿Se puede permitir la alianza con el enemigo en esa forma? No se puede 
permitir.85 
 
This prototypical “enemy of the independence of Puerto Rico”, identified with the 
natives who cooperate with foreign landowners and managers in the sugar industry, is 
apparently rather different from the paradigmatic figure that Salgado describes to 
reinforce its criticism toward the “modern civilization” of individualism, materialism, and 
capitalism, i.e., the bourgeois. The Brazilian leader resorts to his literary skills to depict 
him with sarcasm and disgust, rendering him a protagonist of his examination of the 
crisis. 
Olha-se para o burguês. Está bem vestido, com o charuto na boca. Acaba 
de sair do Clube onde levou duas horas a almoçar numa roda de elegantes. 
Daqui a pouco vai ter um encontro com uma mulher que não é a sua. Esta 
manhã esteve na praia, seminu, dando pasto aos olhos nas arredondadas 
formas das frinéias familiares que, por sua vez, não perdem a missa, mas 
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acham natural o nudismo. O burguês tem uma renda farta. Vive à tripa 
forra.86 
 
If Albizu insists on the economic reasons that drive Puerto Ricans to accept the 
U.S. rule, Salgado clearly emphasizes the elements of immorality that characterize the 
bourgeois as the internal enemy, limiting his portrait to a generic well-off, urban 
professional or businessman. He conducts his luxury life paying exclusive attention to 
carnal pleasures, inducing in both gluttony and lust. Even more scandalous, for Salgado’s 
idealism, is the fact that this typical personage is the stronger supporter of the corrupt 
political organization of society that characterizes modernity, that is, liberalism. 
According to the Integralist leader, the bourgeois employs this doctrine only to justify 
and protect his vices and his profits. “A Nação é um guarda-noturno”,87 for the current 
well-to-do citizen, since the state has the only task to serve his own personal interests and 
provide security for him, and it is limited to “os soldados que lhe vigiam a casa, os 
agentes de segurança e investigadores que lhe fazem o sono tranqüilo na doçura dos 
lençóis de cambraia.”88 As significantly, with a view to my proposed comparison, it is the 
fact that the same kind of distorted relation that the Brazilian leader observes in place 
between the depraved bourgeois and the policing forces of the state is depicted by the 
president of the PNPR when he criticizes the effect of U.S. colonization. He says that 
“Puerto Rico será otro Hawai. Los puertorriqueños seremos peones, capataces y policías, 
para garantizar a los invasores en el goce de nuestra riqueza frente a la oposición nuestra 
que puede surgir.”89 Therefore, the two political leaders share a similar revulsion at the 
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pretension by the ruling class – the wealthy national sectors in the case of Brazil, the 
foreign invaders and exploiters in the case of Puerto Rico – to profiting from a security 
apparatus that protects their vices and speculations. This minimalist, egoistic, and 
utilitarian conception of the state is at the opposite pole from the institutional projects that 
both Salgado and Albizu would develop. The former is the most explicit on this point. 
With a particularly vivid image, he discredits the parasitical figure of the bourgeois 
affirming: “O nédio usufrutuário da ordem é ateu, não respeita a sacralidade da família, 
nem liga importância à idéia da Pátria. Leva uma vida de macaco, só pensando em 
prazeres.”90 As a matter of fact, this foe is literary portrayed as the perfect violator, at 
once, of all the fundamental values that are expressed in the Integralist trinity: Deus, 
Pátria, Família.  
Salgado’s obsession with dissolution and pleasures is not limited to a moralistic 
discourse, but plays a vital role in the construction of his political argumentation. In fact, 
the triumph of these bourgeois disvalues in modern times directly provoked the rise of a 
new, ruinous ideology, which is giving a substantial contribution to the annihilation of 
the humankind: Marxism. Indeed, Salgado notices a clear genetic relationship between 
the two apparently competing major systems of ideas, liberalism and socialism, and 
explicitly blames the former for the emergence of the latter. 
O comunismo não é uma causa: é um sintoma. O mal não é o comunismo 
em si, porém as causas que geram o comunismo. [...] 
Onde estão as fontes do comunismo? 
No materialismo burguês.91 
 
“Bourgeois materialism”, therefore, is not only a disgraceful behavior that 
corrupts the leisured classes, but is also the main cause of the ethical decadence of the 
                                                 
90 Salgado, “As duas faces de Satanás [1935],” in O pensamento revolucionário, 34. 
91 Ibid., 32. 
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proletariat, and of its unrest. On these grounds, Salgado’s moral campaign assumes, if 
possible, an even more crucial position in its ideological construction. “Para combater o 
comunismo impõe-se combater, em primeiro lugar, o materialismo, o ateísmo, o 
sensualismo, a grosseria dos sentimentos, a expansão desenfreada dos instintos”,92 the 
author reinforces. Salgado unites liberalism and socialism in his apocalyptic 
condemnation, and, pinpointing the responsibility of the former for the spiritual and 
material squalor which ignited revolutionary flames, firmly establishes, at the same time, 
their joint responsibility for the crisis, and a sort of ideological tabula rasa on which he 
pretends to elaborate and impose his original doctrine. In other words, Salgado’s 
emphasis on ethics operates as an instrument to clear the ground from what he considered 
his main competitors, that is, the liberal tradition on which the Old Republic and, more 
recently, the Paulista Revolution were based, and the emerging revolutionary socialism 
that was incarnated, in Brazil, by the Communist Party established in 1922 and by the 
leftist attempt to overthrow Vargas in 1935. 
In such a conflictive community, the author argues, political life had inevitably 
become a meaningless competition among factions that do not represent ideas or projects, 
but only partial interests and extemporary intrigues. Salgado provides a scornful portrait 
of the democratic system, choosing to put aside for a moment his philosophical 
argumentations and to resort to a metaphor that he draws from the popular imaginative 
world: soccer. 
A política, para nos, não é jogo de futebol a que ficou reduzida a atividade 
social das nacionalidades, no transcurso do século XIX. A substituição das 
corporações medievais pelos partidos criou as equipes esportivas para os 
“matches” eleitorais e parlamentares. A organização sindical, a luta de 
classe, firmaram as regras fixando as posições dos “players”. As massas 
                                                 
92 Ibid., 34-35. 
 47
populares transformaram-se em multidões de aficionados entregues à 
superexcitação das “torcidas” frenéticas. Os parlamentos eram os grandes 
“stadiuns” [sic] onde os jogadores se colocavam: a III Internacional na 
extrema esquerda, a II Internacional na meia-esquerda, os liberais 
democratas no centro, os conservadores na meia-direita, os reacionários na 
extrema-direita.93 
 
After fully discrediting Brazilian politics both for its destructive dominant 
ideologies – liberalism and socialism – and for its everyday sterile developments, 
Salgado has set the stage for his proposal of a “visão totalitária da sociedade, do mundo e 
das nações,”94 i.e., for his project of a radically new civilization that will be destined for 
the replacement of a decadent modernity. 
In Albizu’s thought, as a direct consequence of the colonial status of Puerto Rico 
and of the specific cultural tradition of hispanismo in which he operates,95 the emphasis is 
placed not on broad issues of political ideas and systems, like in Salgado, but rather on 
the dynamics of submission that the U.S. hegemony nourish in the island, and on the 
spiritual resources to which the Puerto Rican people can resort in order to counter the 
oppression. In other words, the need to construct a relentless opposite, an “other” with 
which any reconciliation is simply inadmissible, and which is clearly identifiable, is far 
more pressing in a situation where formal independence from a colonial power is the first 
issue at stake. This is the reason why, as I will explore in the next chapter, Pedro Albizu 
Campos grounds his core ideological formulation less on the criticism toward material 
exploitation, and more on a culturalist opposition between two divergent civilizations that 
fight to impose their global superiority: the Greco-Roman tradition, in its Hispanic 
(American) variety,  and the Anglo-Saxon culture, in its North American incarnation. 
                                                 
93 Salgado, “Esquerdas e direitas [1937],” in Ibid., 98. 
94 Ibid. 
95 See note 79. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
REVIVING THE NATION 
 
Pedro Albizu Campos, in his efforts to establish an ideological background for his 
party’s struggle for independence, completely reverses the prevailing opinion about the 
relation between the United States and Puerto Rico in his time. What the so called 
nacionalismo cultural or moderado96 considered a benevolent and paternalistic colonial 
power that brought material advancement and a civilized tradition to the island becomes, 
in Albizu’s thought, the last manifestation of a decadent civilization. The Puerto Rican 
leader inserts the conflict that his country was experiencing into a broader, global clash, 
assigning specific roles to the two contenders. He regards the United States as a 
representative of Anglo-Saxon civilization, while Puerto Rico is a continuation in the 
New World of Greco-Roman civilization. This classification permits him to employ, in 
his highly elaborated rhetoric, a rich set of references to a remote past that, in spite of 
being clearly fictitious, strengthens and dignifies his independence claims. The first step 
is the exaltation of the superiority of the classical heritage, through the construction of an 
imagined genealogy that links ancient Greece with modern Puerto Rico. 
Nosotros, señores, recordamos al hombre que fue el instrumento de esta 
inmensa obra [Christopher Columbus], recordamos a la madre patria 
España y España, señores, es una de las pocas naciones que siempre ha 
sido civilizada. ¡Oidlo bien! La barbarie nunca dominó a España. La 
barbarie nunca dominó a Italia. La barbarie nunca dominó a Grecia. 
Nuestra civilización grecolatina viene de Grecia, Italia y España, de las 
tres penínsulas madres que tienen la civilización de Occidente. La barbarie 
nunca pudo establecerse en esas penínsulas […]. En esas tres penínsulas 
                                                 
96 See Chapter 3. 
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nunca hubo barbarie. Hubo sí, señores, ocupación transitoria de parte de 
sus territorios por pueblos bárbaros.97 
 
Albizu connects the glorious tradition of “the three mother peninsulas” that 
shaped “the Western civilization” with the Ibero-American world, through the 
emblematic figure of Christopher Columbus. Claiming that the territories in which the 
Greco-Roman cultures have developed never suffered long-term consequences of 
“barbarity”, but just a “temporary occupation”, the author establishes the basis for the 
second stage of his historical parallelism. “¡Qué contraste, señores! Han pasado dos mil 
años de la civilización romana y estamos todavía frente a la barbarie. Estamos frente a los 
Estados Unidos que lo primero que hace es desposeernos de nuestras tierras.”98 
Therefore, in Albizu’s philosophy of history, the United States plays toward Puerto Rico 
the same role that the “barbarian peoples” played toward Southern Europe at the end of 
classical antiquity. This premise leads to a radical reformulation of the hierarchy between 
the two poles: the power of the North is that of an uncivilized people that exerts a 
provisional control over a developed, superior nation. 
Los pueblos bárbaros nada pueden aportar a esos pueblos [the 
“iberoamericanos”], ni siquiera las riquezas materiales. Los imperios que 
se lanzan sobre pueblos bárbaros terminan con embrutecerse. […] 
Pero avanzar sobre un pueblo civilizado, ese es un bien definitivo. Ese es 
el por qué el yanki está en Puerto Rico.99 
 
The assertion that the United States is the real beneficiary of the colonial status, 
not only economically, but also culturally, is of course an extreme challenge to the 
arguments in favor of a period of apprenticeship to modernity, as many Puerto Rican 
intellectuals and politicians theorized. Although this is not the only reason that Albizu 
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98 Ibid., 14. 
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adduces in order to ground Puerto Rican independence,100 that claim of cultural 
supremacy of the Ibero-American tradition over the Anglo-American one constitutes the 
backbone of the anti-colonial and nationalistic discourse of the PNPR’s leader. An 
important corollary of this doctrine concerns the issue of race. Albizu proudly 
emphasizes the distinction between a cultural notion of race peculiar to the Greco-Roman 
civilization, based on habits and values, and a biological concept of race typical of the 
Anglo-Saxon civilization, that discriminated against people according to their physical 
appearance. 
En efecto, señores, la estructura nacional no es la estructura de la 
epidermis; no es la estructura de la piel porque por la piel se juzga al gato, 
se juzga al cabro, se juzga hasta a las fieras […]. Y, señores, es de brutos 
levantar la división entre los hombres por la epidermis. Eso solamente se 
le puede ocurrir a los brutos norteamericanos. A un pueblo salvaje, ¡sí que 
se le ocurre eso! Pero los pueblos de la civilización, los pueblos madres, 
esos están viviendo siempre de la unidad emanante de los hombres, de la 
unidad indestructible de los hombres. Están viendo que la piel es un 
accidente.  La raza, señores, sigue la transformación de un pueblo bajo un 
ideario del espíritu […]. Por eso existe la raza iberoamericana.101 
 
In this way, the author explicitly states the centrality of a sense of cultural 
belonging and spiritual unity for the definition of a national identity, and on this 
culturalist conception of race he will build his message of regeneration. 
                                                 
100 Albizu, who studied law and worked as a lawyer, also produced a legal motivation for the illegitimacy 
of U.S. occupation. When the invasion occurred, in 1898, the structure of government of the Spanish 
colony had just been reformed. On November 25, 1897, after decades of pressures and negotiations 
between the Puerto Rican elites and the Spanish authorities, the Cortes had approved a Carta Autonómica 
for Puerto Rico, that conferred to the island considerable administrative autonomy and a partially elected 
parliament, although under a governor appointed by the colonial ruler. That assembly, specifically, had 
obtained the power of accepting or rejecting any international treaty concerning Puerto Rico that Spain 
would have negotiated with a third party. On these grounds, Albizu was able to contest the legitimacy of 
the Treaty of Paris, that was signed by Spain and the United States on December 10, 1898, and ratified, 
among other things, the cession of the island to the North American power. “[N]ingún tratado de España, 
negociado por España, era válido sin la ratificación del Parlamento de Puerto Rico. […] España no podía 
ceder a Puerto Rico porque Puerto Rico no era res in commercium. Puerto Rico se convirtió en una nación 
soberana en virtud de la Carta Autonómica que España no podía cambiar sin el consentimiento de Puerto 
Rico. […] Y Estados Unidos no podía aceptar dicha cesión porque estaba obligado a respetar la 
independencia de Puerto Rico.” (Quoted with no date in Corretjer, Albizu Campos, 25-26). 
101 Albizu Campos, “Discurso […] del Día de la Raza [1933],” in República de Puerto Rico, 10-11. 
 51
¿Que [sic] existe sangre africana? Yo también la llevo en las venas y la 
llevo con el supremo orgullo de la dignidad humana. 
Aquí tenemos sangre india, aquí hay los arquetipos puros de sangre india. 
Yo también tengo sangre india y por eso me siento perfectamente 
americano, americano autóctono, en la verdadera acepción de la palabra. 
¿Que [sic] hay sangre blanca en nosotros? Yo también la llevo en las 
venas. Mi padre era vizcaino [sic] y viene de la raza más pura de toda 
Europa. 
Y ese tipo que se viene formando, o sea, de la unidad del sentimiento, de 
la homogeneidad de la acción cotidiana, viene formando también la 
unidad racial en el sentido biológico y viene restaurando al hombre a su 
prístina originalidad porque el hombre no empezó amarillo, blanco ni 
negro, sino hombre solamente, como el Divino Creador.102 
 
It is interesting to observe that the author mentions with pride his condition of 
mixed blood, although he did not avoid the use of a terminology that echoed racialist 
discourses, for example defining the Basque as “the purest race in the entire Europe.” In 
addition, he refers again to a mythical past – in this case, an ancestral, biblical time of 
“originality” – to substantiate his argument, showing in this case a sort of cyclical 
conception of history. Indeed, Puerto Rico is conceived of as a melting pot of peoples 
that will lead humanity to a sort of edenic condition, in which it will be both spiritually 
and physically united and homogenized. Once again, the author employs the metaphor of 
“palingenesis,” of regeneration. On another level of interpretation, as Rodríguez Vázquez 
acutely observed, this contraposition of two different concepts and experiences of race in 
the Americas anticipated the categories on slavery and racialism proposed later in the 
1930s and 1940s by Gilberto Freyre and Frank Tannenbaum. In particular, it contains the 
core of the myth of Brazil and, to some extent, Spanish America as a “racial paradise” 
where the transition to free labor was bloodless and unproblematic, and the living 
conditions of African descendants were better than those of the black people inhabiting 
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North America.103 Moreover, this formulation of the theory of race, with its appreciation 
of miscegenation under the homogenizing force of Hispanic culture, makes Albizu’s 
nationalism different from the so called “black nationalism”, that had a prominent role, 
for example, in the political discourse of the British Caribbean since the early twentieth 
century.104 Albizu himself concluded: “Nosotros somos un pueblo predestinado en la 
historia, porque Puerto Rico es la primera nación del mundo donde se forma la unidad del 
espíritu con la unidad biológica del cuerpo.”105 
So, the primacy of Puerto Rico is the product of a superior historical heritage, that 
reached the Caribbean thanks to the Spanish colonization and is responsible for all the 
virtuous characteristics that Albizu attributes to his homeland, in the pre-invasion period, 
and denies to the United States: the spiritual authority conferred by the affiliation to an 
age-old civilization, an equitable distribution of wealth and land,106 a pacific cohabitation 
and integration among people of different ethnic origins. For that reason, Albizu can say: 
“Puerto Rico es la nacionalidad más integrada del continente en el sentido 
étnico y cultural, tenemos la masa más homogénea, noble e inteligente de 
América. Pero también tenemos la clase directora más podrida de todo el 
continente.”107 
 
This unequivocal distinction between the pride in Puerto Rican foundations and 
the scorn for those who shared administrative responsibilities with the occupying force 
makes what Ferrao states on Albizu’s groundbreaking role not completely acceptable. 
El albizuismo surgió más como rechazo a las formas políticas endebles y 
al estilo ambivalente de los representantes del nacionalismo cultural, y no 
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tanto como negación de su contenido ideológico. En otras palabras, el 
albizuismo implicó una ruptura al nivel de los medios de lucha (o más 
bien la ausencia de ellos) y las prácticas políticas que exhibía dicho 
nacionalismo, pero mantuvo un perceptible hilo de continuidad con éste en 
cuanto a lo esencial que era la concepción de la sociedad, la idea de la 
identidad nacional y la óptica social que inspiraba a ambas.108 
 
Albizu’s innovations in the organization of the PNPR and in the adoption of 
combative language and means are surely self-evident, but do not constitute his only 
original contribution. The changes produced in the traditional view of both Puerto Rico 
and the United States, in the allocation of virtues and responsibilities, and in the 
interpretation of their mutual historical roles are remarkable and decisive. In addition, 
Ferrao’s statement contrasts with another conclusion that he proposes later, and that 
clearly emerges from the analysis of Albizu’s conception and reconstruction of the past. 
The heart of his political philosophy is “una suerte de noción social regresiva, un deseo 
de vuelta-a-la-sociedad-pre-invasión-norteamericana, [combined with] la evocación y 
exaltación desmedida de la sociedad decimonónica.”109 As pointed out by Rodríguez 
Vázquez: 
Albizu no tenía ninguna duda de la existencia de una nacionalidad 
puertorriqueña ya formada para 1898. Los norteamericanos encontraron 
“una nación hecha, mucho más adelantada que sus provincias ‘estados’ y 
comparable favorablemente con cualquiera de sus ‘estados’ más 
avanzados”. Al momento de la invasión, la nación “más inteligente del 
nuevo mundo” era ya un cuerpo social rico y bien organizado, una 
“nacionalidad civilizada” que había servido de ‘vanguardia en el nuevo 
mundo’ y que como centro del primer obispado de América fue la base 
para “la obra cristiana” en el Continente.110 
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This “myth of the perfect nation”111 undoubtedly performs the function as “an 
anticolonial counter myth to combat the American imperialist discourse”,112 but it also 
constitutes a vision that substantially departs from the cautious approach shared by the 
vast majority of the Puerto Rican influential groups of the time. They expressed some 
doubts on the potentialities of the island as an autonomous entity and – an inadmissible 
breakdown for Albizu – willingly accepted, or at least tolerated, the paternalistic attitude 
of the U.S. rulers in the name of progress.113 This utilitarian acceptance of a U.S. 
protectorate would be the ideal base of moderate nationalism that would flourish again 
and prevail in Puerto Rico beginning the 1940s, with the rise of Luis Muñoz Marín and 
his Partido Popular Democrático, as rightly signaled by Rodríguez Vázquez.114 Albizu’s 
formulation of radical nationalism, with his emphasis on the idealized Hispanic historical 
heritage of Puerto Rico, pride in the intermixed ethnic profile of its population, and an 
absolute confidence in the potential of the island as an independent State, clearly 
constitutes an alternative tradition in the panorama of Puerto Rican political and 
intellectual history. 
In the case of Plínio Salgado’s project to renovate the Brazilian nation, the 
starting point is really about the participation in the heated disputes on artistic formulae 
and cultural identity within the Modernist movement of the 1920s and the early 1930s, 
and not so much a critical perspective on the political debate of the time, as in Albizu. 
                                                 
111 This appropriate expression was used by Rodríguez Vázquez in the title of the article – José Juan 
Rodríguez Vázquez, “El nacionalismo radical en la fase de maniobra: Pedro Albizu Campos y el mito de la 
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The future leader of the AIB had been part of the varied group of writers, artists and 
critics who, from 1922 on, after the pioneering event of the Semana de Arte Moderna in 
São Paulo, had radically contested the formalist and “inauthentic” tendencies of Brazilian 
intellectual life, and had started a search for more effective forms to express the diversity 
of Brazilian reality. Nevertheless, the majority of this avant-gard, in the second half of 
the 1920s, had followed the path opened by Oswald de Andrade toward the adoption of 
recent European stylistic trends, such as Futurism and Symbolism. This proposal was 
summarized in the 1924 manifesto Poesia Pau Brasil, in which Oswald de Andrade 
recommended that Brazilians examined original Brazilian “raw material” – i.e., the 
syncretistic expressions of popular culture – through the lenses of the modern artistic 
innovations imported from the Old World, with the aim of producing a cultural 
commodity that could be exported abroad. This metaphorical image of an unequal 
commercial exchange of cultural products was obviously molded around the economic 
dependency of Brazil at the time. This is also the reason for the adoption of pau brasil, 
the red dyewood exploited by the Portuguese early colonizers in the 16th century, as the 
symbol of the movement.115 Salgado rejects this new definition of the Modernist avant-
garde and starts to distance himself from the group of the Semana de Arte Moderna. His 
judgment on his former fellows becomes increasingly harsh. 
Muitos não comprehenderam o plano de batalha. Proseguiram, no campo 
literario, a marcha para a dissolução completa, subordinando-se aos 
phenomenos exclusivamente europeus da ruina da sensibilidade e 
decomposição senil de após-guerra. [... C]om o espirito europeu de 
viajantes curiosos ou experimentalistas, perderam-se numa brasilidade 
artificial, que se desenvolveu guardando a linha das escolas decadentes em 
que se bolchevizou e destruiu a arte no Velho Mundo.116 
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This criticism toward the internationalist and decadent drift of the Pau Brasil 
faction leads Salgado not only to refuse extreme innovations in art and literature, but also 
to begin formulating a broader cultural program that would set the basis for his later 
social and political project. The protagonist of this innovative proposal is the indigenous 
tupi, who the author raises to the rank of the authentic incarnation of the Brazilian people. 
According to him, the natural gifts of the natives, their intuition and mysticism, should 
have guided the process of revelation of the Brazilian soul, of its atavistic roots that the 
ruling class had ignored up to then. This choice, in Salgado’s mind, permits him to 
discard every imported taste and tendency, and to reformulate an imaginative world 
around autochthonous symbols. Therefore, in addition to the tupi, Salgado’s group 
chooses the tapir (anta), being the biggest native mammal of South America, as the new 
emblem of the nation. Revealingly, the title of the keynote document of this faction, 
published in 1929, is Manifesto Nhegaçu Verde Amarelo da Escola da Anta. This 
manifesto, by the way, explicitly refuses any hypothesis of institutional change in the 
Brazilian state.117 
Salgado’s conversion to radical politics, in reality, occurs in 1930, the year after 
the formal constitution of the verdeamarelista branch of the Modernist movement. In his 
a posteriori reconstruction of this period, the author describes his long journey through 
Europe and the Middle East as the crucial moment for his transition from literary and 
aesthetic interests to a more mature anxiety about the formulation of a new political 
doctrine, to be designed as the solution for Brazilian problems. Although it is important 
to remember that Salgado writes his account in 1935, under the influence of the 
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succeeding events and with the purpose of demonstrating the coherence of his intellectual 
and political trajectory, it is worth quoting at some length. 
Em 1930, segui para a Europa. O periodo que vae de 1927 a 1930 revelou-
me a impossibilidade de fazer algo novo dentro dos velhos quadros 
partidarios e sociaes do paiz. [...] Estava eu em 30, convencido da 
urgencia de uma revolução do pensamento nacional, da consciencia das 
massas brasileiras. Meus amigos [...] perguntavam-me em que estado de 
espirito eu partia. “Voltarei para fazer a nossa revolução”, respondia-lhes. 
Depois de percorrer 14 países, como preceptor de un moço de uma familia 
paulista, que me abriu um credito sufficiente para as vultuosas despezas, 
terminei em Paris “O Esperado” [his second novel, after the publication of 
O Estrangeiro in 1926] e esbocei o manifesto que pretendia lançar ás 
novas gerações brasileiras. Vira a renovação politica da Turquia, o 
fascismo na Itália, lêra uma vasta literatura communista que circulava em 
Paris, estudára a social democracia alemã, examinára a pequenina Bélgica, 
meditára no Egypto, sobre o imperialismo inglez, observára a anarquia dos 
espiritos na Hespanha e a nova ordem em Portugal, e tudo me 
demonstrava a morte de uma civilização, o advento de uma nova etapa 
humana.118 
 
What is particularly relevant in this dense passage is the fact that Salgado unites 
the plurality of realities that he observed in the Old World under the same judgment, i.e. 
as evidence of “the death of a civilization, the coming of a new human age.” This 
additional reference to decadence – that, as we have seen in the previous chapter, is a 
leitmotiv in Salgado’s rhetoric – is curious because examples of both societies in ruins 
and new political and institutional models are blended. For instance, the case of Spain, in 
a state of “spiritual anarchy” and on the eve of the overthrow of the monarchical and 
conservative forces by the Second Republic, is on the same level with what the author 
considers virtuous nationalist experiments of the time: Turkey, Italy, and Portugal. At this 
stage, Salgado distances himself from the inclination toward imitation of foreign 
experiences, in both the artistic and the political realms. Crossing swords not only with 
the intellectual and government elite of the First Republic, but also with his previous 
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avant-garde fellows of the Semana de Arte Moderna, the future leader of the AIB pursues 
a return to what he considers the authentic roots of the Brazilian people. In his opinion, 
the culture and the institutions of the old liberal and capitalist order, in its Brazilian 
version, have failed, because they had been patterned on the European and North 
American model and had led the country to moral and material corruption. Similarly, the 
Modernist reaction to Brazilian decadence had proved to be limited to elitist, aesthetic 
innovations, and, through Oswald de Andrade’s sensitivity to European cultural and 
political trends, was heading for outrageous leftist solutions.119 These are the reasons 
why, in the years that precede the creation of the Integralist movement, Salgado 
emphasizes the need for a revalorization of the Brazilian pre-European indigene. 
It is convenient to remember that this instrumental use of indigenous images 
evidently is an intellectual device in the hands of an ambitious figure in search of 
innovative approaches to longstanding problems in Brazilian culture and society. In 
particular, when the AIB is founded and becomes a protagonist of the Brazilian political 
life in the 1930s, neither the question of the real indigenous population of the country, 
nor the role of militants of native origin are significant for the Integralists. Indeed, the 
party and its ideology, participating in the post-1930 race for power, would be far more 
focused on the themes of the traditional political debate that were of interest to the 
inhabitants of urban centers and of the Europeanized rural areas. Nevertheless, Salgado 
                                                 
119 As a matter of fact, Oswald de Andrade first reformulated his aesthetic research under the trope of 
“anthropophagy”, considering the cannibalistic incorporation and digestion of foreign cultural products as 
the real, national process of identity building. Then, he underwent a conversion to Marxism, adopted a 
heated anti-bourgeois and anti-clerical rhetoric, and in 1931entered the Communist Party (Jáuregui, 435-
437 and 446-447). The two short-lived, but very intriguing, reviews that Oswald de Andrade published at 
the peak of these two distinctive phases are, respectively, Revista de Antropofagia and O Homem do Povo. 
The complete collections of these publications were recently reprinted as Revista de Antropofagia [1928-
1929] (São Paulo, Editôra Abril, 1975) and O Homem do Povo [1931] (São Paulo: Imprensa Oficial do 
Estado; Divisão de Arquivo do Estado de São Paulo, 1984). 
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uses his nativist rhetoric to assess one of the most burning issues of the Brazilian public 
debate at the time, i.e. the integration of the masses of foreign workers who had entered 
and were keeping entering the country.120 In fact, Salgado goes so far as claiming that 
“todas as raças extrangeiras que para aqui vierem terão no tupy uma especie de 
denominador commum.”121 The author conceives of this homogenizing role of the native 
as part of a wider project for the future of the humankind. 
Elle [the indigene] é, incontestavelmente, o facto preponderante na 
formação dessa grande raça harmoniosa do futuro, constituida de 
elementos de todas as raças adaptadas na America do Sul. 
O grande sonho imperialista desse povo irá realizar-se um dia, sem effusão 
de sangue, mas numa eucharistia de sangues de todas as origens. A anta 
abrirá carreiros para as marchas de todas as raças no grande matrimonio da 
humanidade.122 
 
The project of the unification of humanity in a single, intermixed race is directly 
inspired by the theories of the Mexican intellectual José Vasconcelos (1922-1959), who 
in 1925 had proposed this racial utopia in La Raza Cósmica. Misión de la raza 
iberoamericana. Notas de viajes a la América del Sur.123 The natural terrain on which the 
“cosmic race” could effectively be forged is, of course, Latin America. Although in the 
case of Albizu the reference to Vasconcelos is not overt, it is evident that he and the 
Brazilian intellectual share a peculiar, visionary perspective on the future of the 
subcontinent. In their discourses, Puerto Rico and Brazil have the groundbreaking role of 
offering to humanity, through their cultural and racial unique cohesion, an 
anthropological revolution. They imagine their respective countries as laboratories in 
                                                 
120 In eight decades, between 1851 and 1930, about 4,300,000 immigrants entered Brazil, and the majority 
of them did it after 1880. See Chiara Vangelista, Dal vecchio al nuovo Continente. L’immigrazione in 
America Latina (Torino: Paravia, 1997), 163. 
121 Salgado, Despertemos, 38. 
122 Ibid., 40. 
123 Salgado explicitly mentions Vasconcelos in ibid., 39.  
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which a new, promising future for the earth will be initiated. This destiny is an alternative 
to the forms of modernity – individualism, materialism, capitalism, liberal democracy – 
that had developed until then under the leadership of Western Europe and the United 
States. Therefore, the protagonists of this revolution would be historically marginalized 
communities that were excluded from or damaged by modernity: the Puerto Rican 
colonized people, and the Brazilian natives. Of course, this proposal, being framed by 
refined intellectuals who are also heads of radical minority movements involved in 
everyday politics, appears to be by far more a rhetorical device and a symbolic claim than 
a practical project of mass participation of the subalterns, given the limited capacity of 
the PNPR and the AIB to mobilize the popular sectors. 
Nevertheless, this imaginative argument is the premise of a further, central step in 
the construction of the authors’ doctrines. Significantly, investing the process of national 
regeneration and consolidation with a universal purpose, both Salgado and Albizu create 
the space for the vision of an “imperial” destiny for their home countries. In fact, Salgado 
defines his version of the “cosmic race” utopia as a “great, bloodless imperialist dream,” 
that the moral superiority of the Brazilian natives and the natural resources of South 
America will make possible. The tupi “hade [sic] descer um dia do sertão [...] para a 
invasão das Cidades e a grande revolução do pensamento nacional [...]. Só então, será 
proclamada a nossa independencia mental.” 124 Moreover, the revolutionary role assigned 
to the natives on the moral and cultural level is complemented by a trust in the bright 
future of Brazil as an economic power: “o Brasil será a maior nação do mundo, por 
dispôr de mais terras, e terras ferteis, e poder desenvolver todas as culturas, porque se 
                                                 
124 Ibid., 50. 
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extende através de zonas as mais distinctas.”125 Despite the very different situation of 
Puerto Rico in comparison with Brazil, for his part Albizu explicitly asserts the leading 
role of his homeland, as a repository of the glorious Hispanic heritage, over the future 
international order. 
“Nuestra América conserva el equilibrio del mundo. […] Como 
latinoamericanos hemos reunido las civilizaciones indígena y cristiana. 
Como verdaderos americanos vemos claramente que nuestra hegemonía 
en el Antiguo Mundo es inevitable para el bien del género humano.”126 
 
This conviction of being the protagonist of a universal mission is expounded, in 
another of Albizu’s discourses, as a course in progressive stages that would reverse the 
balance of power in the western hemisphere and, as a direct consequence, in the entire 
world. 
Tenemos un bien que infundir en América. Empecemos por asegurar a 
nuestra posteridad en Puerto Rico nuestra propia civilización; y por llevar, 
en conjunción con los pueblos de las Antillas, nuestra civilización a 
Norteamérica, que cubre [sic] al mundo de polo a polo y que se afirme en 
el planeta para siempre. 
Por eso el nacionalismo postula cuatro hermosos principios: la 
independencia de Puerto Rico, la confederación antillana, la unión 
panamericana y la hegemonía de los pueblos íberoamericanos [sic] para 
honra de nosotros todos ante la posteridad.127 
 
Another crucial common characteristic of the two projects of national 
“palingenesis” and radical reshaping of the modern world is the relevance of religion. 
Catholic tradition deeply informs both the language and the content of Salgado and 
Albizu’s discourses. As a matter of fact, their respective versions of “ultranationalism” 
are framed around a constant use of a religiously infused terminology,128 and produce a 
                                                 
125 Ibid., 34. 
126 Quoted with no date in Corretjer, Albizu Campos, 41-42. 
127 Albizu Campos, “Discurso […] del Dia de la Raza [1933],” in República de Puerto Rico, 33-34. 
128 In this respect, it is interesting to notice that Salgado defines his racial utopia also as an “Eucharist of 
bloods of all origins” (Despertemos, 38), and Albizu points out that skin color is irrelevant because at the 
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peculiar conception of politics as a moral, sacred enterprise. This distinctive trait of 
Salgado’s Integralism and Albizu’s Nationalism deeply affects not only the very 
programmatic platform of the two political parties, but also their inner structure, and the 
conception of their leaderships. Therefore, the AIB and the PNPR would be molded as 
the instruments for the achievement, at the same time, of a national rebirth and of an 
international role in guiding an ethical and political battle that would acquire the features 
of a quasi-religious campaign. Consequently, this specific way of conceiving of and 
participating in political life deserves an extended treatment in the next chapter, in which 
Emilio Gentile’s notion of “political religion” will prove to be a valuable analytical tool. 
                                                                                                                                                 
moment of Creation the human being was “just man, as the Divine Creator” (“Discurso […] del Día de la 
Raza [1933],” in República de Puerto Rico, 12). 
 63
CHAPTER VI 
 
POLITICS AS A SACRED MISSION 
 
Historians have treated Plínio Salgado and Pedro Albizu Campos very differently 
with regard to the religious aspects of their political thought. In the case of the Brazilian 
intellectual and leader, scholars tend to overlook the issue, limiting their comments to 
superficial glimpses that took Salgado’s adhesion to the Catholic tradition for granted. 
This is the case of the leading historian on Integralism, Hélgio Trindade, who simply 
identifies the cultural origins of Integralism in a “ética […] de inspiração cristã,” a 
“humanismo espiritualista,” and the “ideal medieval de uma sociedade harmoniosa.”129 
Two of the most detailed investigations on the contents of the “spiritual revolution” 
proposed by the AIB do not explicitly address the issue of religion.130 Finally, in a more 
recent essay, that adopts a sophisticated methodology for the intellectual history of 
Salgado’s doctrine, Giselda Brito Silva defines this last as “um tipo de nacionalismo no 
qual vinculava idéias políticas com idéias religiosas.”131 Therefore, it is possible to 
conclude that the relationship between Integralism and religion still awaits a more in-
depth and focused treatment by scholars. 
The literature on Albizu is fairly different on this point. Historians agree on the 
fact that he developed his profound faith in traditional Catholicism during his youth as a 
student in Boston. Before leaving Puerto Rico to study in the United States, in 1912, he 
had been in close contact with spiritualist and Masonic groups of his hometown. In fact, 
                                                 
129 Trindade, Integralismo, 209. 
130 Vasconcelos, A ideologia curupira, and Cavalari, Integralismo. 
131 Silva, “Uma proposta de análise interdisciplinar…,” 10. 
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the future leader of the PNPR was able to start his university career in the United States 
thanks to a scholarship granted by the lodge of Ponce.132 Nevertheless, when he returned 
to the island in 1921, Albizu had developed a staunch adhesion to Catholicism, mainly as 
a consequence of his friendship with its Irish priests and his attendance at their Church in 
Boston. Significantly, the Irish Catholic circles of the city were active supporters of the 
Irish independence movement, and offered Albizu an example of political irredentism 
combined with strong religious beliefs. The conception of the Irish liberation struggle 
against the British as a conflict between Catholics and Protestants surely provided an 
effective framework for Albizu’s polarization between an oppressed Catholic Puerto Rico 
and an oppressive Protestant United States.133 
The centrality of Catholicism in Albizu’s political thought and action did not pass 
unnoticed to scholars, although the relevance accorded to it and the interpretation of its 
place in the nationalist construction has varied considerably. Albizu’s right hand man of 
the 1930s, Juan Antonio Corretjer, is the first prominent figure to address the issue. Being 
one of the leaders of the 1960s leftist shift of Puerto Rican pro-independence circles, 
Corretjer feels the need to justify his master’s Catholicism and conservative positions. 
His explanation refers to Albizu’s vision of a “clash of civilization” taking place on the 
island, and the consequent necessity to reinforce the cohesive elements of Puerto Rican 
identity to resist and fight the invader. He writes: 
Pero su [Albizu’s] actividad catolizante [sic] es un acto consciente de 
conservación de lo que Puerto Rico ha sido, ante la política 
norteamericana de obligar a Puerto Rico a dejar de ser. Si el imperialismo, 
basado en el principio liberal de la libertad de consciencia [sic] y culto, 
estimula la proliferación de las iglesias protestantes, de las creencias 
orientalistas, de la masonería, como factores desintegrantes [sic] de la 
                                                 
132 Ferrao, Pedro Albizu Campos y el nacionalismo puertorriqueño, 263-266. 
133 Ibid., 266-274, Baggio, A questão nacional em Porto Rico, 76-78. 
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unidad psíquica de Puerto Rico, “estimulemos al catolicismo!” – se dice 
Albizu Campos, para conservar lo que el invasor quiere destruir. Este es el 
sentido del conservadorismo esencial del albizuismo como modalidad 
particular del nacionalismo puertorriqueño. De ahí que Albizu diga, y se 
haga dogma entre sus fieles, que “un movimiento de reforma social tiene 
que ser forzosamente heterodoxo mientras que un movimiento 
indepentista [sic] tiene que ser forzosamente ortodoxo.”134 
 
According to this view, in the hands of Albizu Catholicism is a sort of instrument 
in the toolbox with which the independence project must be carried out. Corretjer seems 
to imply that in the case of the nationalist leader an intimate belief in the Catholic faith is 
irrelevant. In other words, what really matters is the effectiveness of the pro-Catholicism 
discourse in differentiating Puerto Rico from the enemy, and in gathering the insurgent 
people’s strength in order to win the battle for independence. 
More recently, Ferrao had noticed the importance of religious rituals and language 
in the rhetoric of Albizu and in the activities of the party. For example, the 
demonstrations of the PNPR were generally preceded by a Catholic mass, although both 
the officers and the militants of the movement were far from constituting a religiously 
homogenous group.135 More importantly, Ferrao underlines the relevance of religious 
terminology in Albizu’s speeches and writings. 
El propio discurso albizuista estaba salpicado de vocablos e imágenes 
provenientes de la terminología religiosa y cristiana. En ocasiones se 
concibe a la patria como una “diosa”; el municipio de Lares era visto 
como “tierra sagrada”, ya que en él se “bautizó” con sangre el cuerpo de la 
nación en 1868; la visita anual que hacían los nacionalistas a este pueblo 
era considerada como un “peregrinaje” y el propio Albizu se le 
conceptuaba como el “apóstol” de la lucha de independencia. Dios mismo 
                                                 
134 Corretjer, Albizu Campos, 45. No date is provided for the quotations of Albizu’s words.  
135 As a matter of fact, Ferrao points out that “el catolicismo ortodoxo de Albizu no respondía al sentir 
general ni era representativo de la diversidad religiosa dentro de su organización,” that included, in 
prominent positions, protestants, masons, spiritualists, and young leftists. The historian considers this 
contradiction one of the main reasons of PNPR failure. See Ferrao, Pedro Albizu Campos y el nacionalismo 
puertorriqueño, 287-291. 
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recibió el título de “creador y protector de todas las nacionalidades” y las 
asambleas del partido comenzaban con una invocación a El.”136 
 
Indirectly, Ferrao adheres to Corretjer’s interpretation of Albizu’s Catholicism as 
an identity resource that, in his mind, is useful to close the ranks of the nationalist 
activists. Nevertheless, my thesis is that this function cannot be underestimated, but that 
we also need to address this issue at more in-depth level of analysis. In fact, Albizu’s 
religious language and rituals should be considered not as simple instrumental or 
rhetorical devices, but as the expression of a specific conception of politics. In reality, the 
core of Albizu’s reflections is a message that conveys not only a project of state and 
society, but also the ambition of a spiritual and ethical regeneration of the Puerto Rican 
people. In this project, the Christian Gospel serves the function of a paradigmatic 
discourse to be imitated in its basic structures. Similarly, the very experience of Jesus 
Christ and the early Christians constitute the pattern of behavior to be emulated by the 
nationalist vanguard. 
The historian Isabel Gutiérrez del Arroyo is the first to deeply investigate the 
connection between Albizu’s personality and his ethical convictions. Having examined 
accounts and other sources related to his juvenile years, she concludes that in Albizu 
intelligence and spiritual profundity combine with a tendency to severity and dogmatism: 
a peculiar mixture that, according to this scholar, explains the genesis of Albizu’s 
dedication to the cause of independence. 
Certeza moral que deriva también de su catolicismo. Por eso ejerce el 
magisterio. Lo ejerce espontáneamente; se ve impelido a ello por 
incoercible vocación redentora. Albizu es hombre de principios 
firmemente arraigados; es un hombre que vive de certezas. […] Albizu es 
                                                 
136 Ibid., 259-260. 
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afecto a estos verbos que implican un rehacerse, un renacer espiritual, que 
me parece delatan inclinaciones místicas.137 
 
Albizu’s “incoercible redemptive vocation” naturally leads, in Gutiérrez del 
Arroyo’s words, to “una sed insaciable de absolutos. Y es en la fe religiosa, en la fe 
católica, en la moral católica, que sacia su sed de absolutos.”138 This “thirst for absolutes” 
is not limited to his personal conscience, but acquires public significance when it serves 
as the basis of his national redemption project. 
The necessary transformation of the Puerto Rican people, now weak and 
submissive, should pass through a proper process of conversion and absolute dedication 
to the independence struggle, as Albizu explicitly claims. 
Hoy se forman seres amorfos que se comen unos a otros; está destruida la 
felicidad total de nuestros hijos; a ninguno se le predicó la verdad; el 
materialismo los conduce a la muerte en cuerpo y alma. Hay que salir de 
este estado y hacer de nuestro pueblo un pueblo de hermanos, de mártires, 
de santos.139 
 
Salgado, referring to the process that led him to publish the Manifesto de Outubro 
and to found the AIB after the Paulista Revolution, in 1932, emphasizes the power of his 
innovative message to channel the energies and endurance of the young generations into 
a superior mission. 
Certamente Deus queria que o manifesto surgisse das cinzas fumegantes 
da lucta épica, da terra embebida de sangue. Uma mocidade macerada no 
fogo das trincheiras, por certo me iria dar evangelizadores e batalhadores 
enrijecidos no soffrimento e corajosos diante da morte. Assim foi que o 
manifesto, escripto em maio, veiu chamar-se “de outubro”. Elle era a 
synthese de todas as phases de um longo drama intelectual, accrescido do 
intenso espiritualismo que os soffrimentos inspiraram.140 
 
                                                 
137 Gutiérrez del Arroyo, Pedro Albizu Campos o la agonía moral, 42. See also 35-45. 
138 Ibid., 43. 
139 Albizu Campos, “Lecture given on October 10, 1935,” transcribed by Isolina Rondón and quoted in 
Ibid., 5. 
140 Salgado, Despertemos a Nação!, 21. 
 68
The authors’ operation is clear: their response to the perceived corruption and 
decadence of their communities is an appeal for collective adherence to the only available 
source of salvation, i.e. the ethical and political creed of the nation. Nevertheless, this 
faith cannot be limited to a pure celebration of collective identity. In fact, their 
sacralization of the nationalist campaign implies an active, militant participation, that 
revolves, as the use of terms such as “martyrs,” “saints,” and “combatants” underlines, 
around the idea of sacrifice. 
Therefore, their message is in the first instance an appeal for the accomplishment 
of heroic deeds and the acceptance of their potentially tragic consequences. Albizu 
maintains that “[l]a Patria se funda en la emulación del heroísmo. No es de nadie. Ni aún 
de los patriotas. Solo es de los que la han ganado muriendo por ella. Son ellos los que la 
legan a la posteridad.”141 Similarly, Salgado explains that the main purpose of his 
writings is “[q]ue cada um se mire nos espelhos destas paginas e tome a resolução 
necessaria ao cumprimento de um sagrado dever perante Deus e perante o Brasil.”142 This 
“sacred duty” is, of course, to fight for the supreme good of the nation. 
Luctar: eis a grande alegria deste movimento. 
Encontrar difficuldades: eis a nossa volupia. 
Sermos perseguidos: eis o motivo poematico. 
Sermos incomprehendidos: eis um prazer singular que nos mostra uma 
superioridade deliciosa.143 
 
In both authors it is possible to see not only a generic use of religious terms, but 
also, and more importantly, clear allusions to fundamental features of the early followers 
of Christ and the original Christian communities. In other words, the membership with 
the “homeland” is a privilege that can be secured only through a complete, selfless 
                                                 
141 Quoted with no date in Corretjer, Albizu Campos, 22. 
142 Plínio Salgado, Paginas de combate (Rio de Janeiro: H. Antunes, 1937), 6. 
143 Ibid., 88. 
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dedication to its cause; a privilege that acquires a divine character and has the features of 
a conversion. In fact, the radical change required from the militants in their personal life 
is analogous to the commitment demanded of the members of a cult, who should be 
prepared to endure persecution. Salgado proudly asserts the condition of “persecuted” 
and “misunderstood,” and actively constructs a rhetoric of martyrdom. For instance, he 
presents the case of Caetano Spinelli, a worker from the city of Campinas who was killed 
in a confrontation with communist militants, reinforcing in this way both the centrality of 
readiness for the extreme sacrifice, and the popular character of the struggle that his party 
undertakes.144 As quoted above, Albizu states that the “homeland” belongs “only to the 
people who gained it dying for it.” 
Moreover, continuing the analogy with early Christianity, every activist is bound 
to spread the nationalist word and to conquer new followers, by means of an activity that 
the authors explicitly define as “apostolic”. In the aforementioned passage, the Brazilian 
leader calls his militants “evangelists,” and Albizu claims that “[d]e cada hombre y de 
cada mujer hay que hacer un apóstol.”145 
The prominence given to the ethics of martyrdom and apostolate, nevertheless, is 
the source of a controversial aspect of Albizu and Salgado’s doctrines. Like the 
acceptance of the Christian message, the adhesion to their moral and political programs is 
an act of free will, a consciousness raising and a claiming of responsibility in the face of 
                                                 
144 Plínio Salgado, Cartas aos “Camisas-Verdes” (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1935), 85-94. In 
particular, Salgado asserts that “esse humilde miliciano assumiu proporções formidaveis. Elle é um Martyr. 
E é diante desse Martyr que eu vos declaro que o Integralismo é uma revolução do proletariado, dos 
estudantes, dos humildes, dos jovens em espirito” (Ibid., 92). 
145 Albizu Campos, “Conferencia del 10 de Octubre de 1935,” transcribed by Isolina Rondón and quoted in 
Gutiérrez del Arroyo, Pedro Albizu Campos o la agonía moral, 8. 
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widespread passivity and resignation. In the Puerto Rican case, the obligation is the 
opposition to the colonial status. 
El problema de nuestra independencia depende de nuestra voluntad. La 
generación presente tiene una grave responsabilidad histórica que cumplir: 
o prolongar la colonia o adoptar un gesto de hombres dignos. Ante todo 
debemos defender nuestra personalidad porque somos la nacionalidad más 
definida de América.146 
 
The voluntary character of this choice clashes, in Albizu’s formulation, with the 
desire to lead a movement that incarnates the authentic will of the Puerto Rican people at 
large. In a passage in which the author asserts the unwillingness of the PNPR to come to 
terms with the political forces that accept and cooperate with the colonial government, he 
makes a specific statement about the authentic nature of his party. 
Pero nosotros hemos dado instrucciones terminantes, en consonancia con 
la altura moral de nuestro movimiento, que nuestro movimiento, que no es 
un partido político sino el movimiento patriótico que representa los 
derechos integrales de todos los puertorriqueños, no entre en 
combinaciones, en contubernios, ni alianzas, ni pactos, con ningún partido 
de Gobierno.147 
 
The same concept of a “patriotic movement that represents the integral rights of 
all the Puerto Ricans” is later reformulated in an even more explicit assertion: “[n]uestro 
Partido […] en realidad no es un Partido, sino la Patria organizada para rescatar su 
soberanía, para que puedan gozar de la dignidad de ser libres hasta los mismos que hoy 
combaten la Independencia.”148 As a matter of fact, “the Homeland organized to redeem 
its sovereignty” became the official motto of the PNPR, and usually appears on its press 
and pamphlets. 
                                                 
146 M. Rivera Matos, “‘Aquí se dilucidará cuales son los planes y actitud de Estado Unidos hacia los 
pueblos de nuestra raza’, dijo Albizu Campos en el banquete en su honor [El Mundo, 19 de marzo de 
1930],” in Albizu Campos, Obras escogidas, vol. 1, 74. 
147 Albizu Campos, “Discurso político pronunciado en Ponce, el día 31 de octubre de 1932 ,” in República 
de Puerto Rico, 47. 
148 Albizu Campos, “Carta al Sr. Luis Venegas Cortes [El Mundo, 22 de septiembre de 1930],” in Obras 
escogidas, vol. 1, 171. 
 71
Salgado has a very similar uncompromising attitude toward the position of the 
AIB within the Brazilian political system of the 1930s. The following passage refers, 
specifically, to the ephemeral compromise between Vargas’ coalition and the old liberal 
elites that was attained with the 1934 Constitution. 
É por isso que o Integralismo Brasileiro não transaciona, não entra no jogo 
medíocre dos partidos, não se interessa pelas situações governamentais, 
não apóia, nem desapoia governos, não atrapalha os que estão 
administrando uma Nação Morta, não se preocupa com detalhes de leis e 
de regulamentos, nem se dá ao trabalho de criticar a carta constitucional 
votada por uma Assembléia Constituinte que foi um ajuntamento de 
alfaiates talhando a roupa para uma defunto.149 
 
This contemptuous position with regard to other political forces and the Vargas 
government is accompanied by a desire to wholly embody the Homeland, and 
consequently the will of all its members, that obviously reminds Albizu’s position. 
Nosso betume impermeabilizador é uma doutrina. Uma doutrina que gera 
uma mystica. 
Sem mystica não se póde garantir nenhuma defesa nacional, nenhuma 
efficiencia da lucta. 
Sabemos que ha muito patriotismo no paiz. Mas o nosso patriotismo, o dos 
camisas-verdes, é o patriotismo organizado. Que adeanta patriotismo 
disperso, sem direcção, sem technica, sem sacrificio e sem renuncia? 
Nestas horas graves, é preciso que o sentimento da Patria se galvaniza 
numa perfeita communhão de consciencias, de espiritos identificados por 
um ideal supremo. 
O milagre do Integralismo é exactamente esse: ter organizado o 
patriotismo, ter racionalizado as vontades patrioticas, ter objectivado numa 
realidade tangente as reservas occultas das energias nacionaes. 
Fóra do Integralismo não ha salvação. 
Ou o Integralismo vence, ou a Nação morre.150 
 
Integralism, therefore, is the only source of “salvation” for the Nation, being the 
authentic Brazilian “organized patriotism.” Its “doctrine” and “mysticism,” its “perfect 
communion of consciences” and “spirits identified with a supreme ideal” differentiate it 
                                                 
149 Salgado, “A alma de uma Nação [1935],” in O pensamento revolucionário, 275. 
150 Salgado, Paginas de combate, 35-36. 
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from all the other political organizations. The use of this strongly religious terminology is 
reinforced, in the same text, by the image of Integralism as a “waterproofing bitumen.” 
Indeed, the passage is inserted into a broader metaphor that meaningfully proposes 
Salgado’s doctrine as the Noah’s Ark that will drive the Brazilian nation out of the 
tempests of a corrupted modernity. 
É necessario, para se crear a mystica da Patria, a unidade de um 
Pensamento e a longa permanencia de um sacrificio. 
Todas as tentativas sossombrarão no Diluvio. 
O Integralismo, porém, é a Arca da Aliança. 
Dentro della, nos tabernaculos sagrados dos corações, todo o Pensamento 
e todo o Sentimento de um Povo. 
Elles se salvarão no meio das tempestades.151 
 
Albizu is even more explicit in claiming that the redemptive power of his party 
embraces the entirety of the Puerto Rican people, in spite of the level of support for the 
pro-independence project expressed by the individuals. The emphasis on the inclusion of 
the inner enemy in the collective goal of liberation clearly recalls the universalist 
Christian Gospel of salvation directed toward sinners. This argument is reinforced and 
expanded in the following passage. 
Los hombres y las mujeres que se levantan con la bandera de la 
independencia en un pueblo, son venerados por todos porque no piden 
nada para sí que al mismo tiempo no lo pidan para sus hermanos, hasta 
para sus hermanos que sean traidores porque no hay derecho a sentenciar, 
ni al traidor siquiera, a vivir en la ignominia de la esclavitud política.152 
 
This sentence summarizes and connects the main elements of the religiously 
constructed message of the author: the militants express the outrage at the “political 
slavery” imposed by the United States through their altruistic sacrifice, that permits the 
                                                 
151 Ibid., 39-40. It should be noted that in his argument Salgado mixes, or possibly confuses, Noah’s Ark 
with the Ark of the Covenant (“Arca da Aliança”). 
152 Albizu Campos, “Discurso pronunciado en Ponce en la noche del 12 de octubre de 1933 con motivo de 
la celebración del ‘Día de la Raza’,” in República de Puerto Rico, 8. 
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inclusion of the whole nation, including present “traitors,” in the project of future 
redemption. Nonetheless, it also brings out the unsolved problem that also applies to 
Salgado’s Integralism: the contrast between a universalistic message and the exclusivist 
conception of its concrete incarnation, the party. It has already been signaled that 
Albizu’s discourse is framed around a dialectical tension between an individual will and a 
collective project for the nation,153 that materializes in the very trajectory of the PNPR in 
the 1930s. After the appointment of Albizu as head of the party in 1930, it actually 
evolved into a sectarian organization, with a rising level of intolerance toward any 
opinion that diverged from the closed group of Albizu and his collaborators. The result 
was the acceleration of the vicious circle of isolation and radicalization that led to a 
dramatic escalation of violence in the second part of the 1930s.154 Salgado did not 
experience a comparable level of internal dispute, and during the period of its legal 
existence (1932-1937) the AIB remained a cohesive and unitary movement. Nevertheless, 
both Albizu and Salgado had to deal with the unsolvable contradiction between their 
universal goals and the condition of minority of their parties. A paradox that led them to 
formulate a eulogy for the select, inspired vanguard that they constructed in order to head 
the irresponsible masses toward an harmonious future. So, in Albizu’s words, the Puerto 
Rican people continues to “profanar todo, hasta profanar su propia libertad; y tiene que 
levantarse un grupo de hombres y mujeres para decirle que debe ser libre.”155 Pairing his 
ethics of sacrifice with a prophetic and missionary tone, the leader of the PNPR declares 
                                                 
153 Rodríguez Vázquez, El sueño que no cesa, 210-223. 
154 The intricate story of PNPR internal conflicts and dissidences is reconstructed in Ferrao, Pedro Albizu 
Campos y el nacionalismo puertorriqueño, 173-256. 
155 Albizu Campos, “Discurso pronunciado en Ponce en la noche del 12 de octubre de 1933 con motivo de 
la celebración del ‘Día de la Raza’,” in República de Puerto Rico, 24. 
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the legitimacy of his struggle on the basis of the commitment and self-denial of a single 
individual. 
Si bien es cierto que las grandes causas necesitan de la multitud, es más 
cierto que las grandes causas necesitan menos a la multitud que de los 
hombres abnegados. 
Una gran causa está sostenida definitivamente si un solo hombre la 
sostiene con el espíritu del sacrificio necesario.156 
 
The champion of this virtuous behavior in the name of the patria is, of course, 
Albizu himself, who in the course of his life endured all the consequences of his ideas 
and actions, including more than two decades spent in jail. In Albizu’s paradigm, the 
party is essentially an enlightened minority, that is built around an inspired message and 
is immersed in a hostile environment. Therefore, an authoritarian and personalistic 
leadership and a strict internal discipline are vital instruments for its survival and success. 
In this way, Albizu attempts not only to demonstrate the spiritual superiority of Puerto 
Rico over the materialistic United States, through heroism and sacrifice, but also to mold 
in the independence struggle the future character of the emancipated nation. In fact, 
according to Ferrao’s analysis, Albizu refounds the PNPR as “una prefiguración del 
futuro Estado nacional independiente,”157 i.e. as a formative experience for the ruling 
class of the state-to-be. 
Salgado’s spiritual revolution involves a similar imposition of discipline and vow 
of obedience to the undisputed leader. As was pointed out, the author attempts in several 
texts to counter the tendency toward a personality cult within his party, affirming that the 
strength of the Integralist doctrine renders an authoritative personal leadership 
                                                 
156 Albizu Campos, “Oración pronunciada en Ponce el día 16 de octubre 1932, en los funerales de Don 
Ramón Mayoral Barnés,” in ibid., 51. 
157 Ferrao, Pedro Albizu Campos y el nacionalismo puertorriqueño, 135. 
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superfluous.158 Nevertheless, the passages in which Salgado diminishes his role as the 
guide of the movement appear to be essentially a proof of false modesty, and a rhetorical 
device to further exalt his all-embracing, allegedly original ideas. In fact, the political 
history of the AIB attests that Salgado consistently was its central character. Moreover, a 
closer reading of his writings permits us to underscore the leading role that he assigns to 
himself. His prophetic and messianic tone is evident in the following piece: 
E se lestes ou ouvistes estas minhas palavras, o vosso crime é dobrado, 
pois não podereis alegar ao supremo Julgador das vossas ações que não 
apareceu alguém que vos lançasse, por vos amar, e muito, estas verdades 
ao vosso rosto. 
Satanás apoderou-se de vós, burgueses, como se apoderou de muitos 
proletários. [...] 
Urge que vos transformeis, homens do meu tempo, ricos e pobres.159 
 
Here Salgado raises himself to the role of a divine herald, who brings to humanity 
a universal message that would permit everyone to overcome class differences and 
struggles. If an individual has the fortune to be exposed to his enlightened “truths” and 
still ignores them, the author says, this person commits a sinful “crime” against God. In 
other words, the refusal to enter the sectarian group of the Integralists – or at least to 
support it – is an immoral act, a sin against the Salgado’s divinely inspired mission to 
restore the harmony in the declining modern society. Moreover, he claims, “a nossa hora 
deve ser qualquer coisa de maravilhoso e de imprevisto, e só o Chefe deverá saber, no 
instante supremo em que o Destino dos Povos lhe falar aos ouvidos.”160 So, Salgado is 
not only the inspired disseminator of the message; he is also the exclusive repository of 
                                                 
158 Salgado especially develops this point in “Messianismos”, in Plínio Salgado, Paginas de combate (Rio 
de Janeiro: Livraria H. Antunes, 1937), 135-143). This issue is discussed in Ricardo Benzaquen de Araújo, 
Totalitarismo e revolução: o Integralismo de Plínio Salgado (Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Editor, 1987), 
72-76. 
159 Salgado, “As duas faces de Satanás [1935],” in O pensamento revolucionário, 36-37. 
160 Salgado, Paginas de combate, 89. 
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the privilege to accomplish “the Destiny of the Peoples,” in an indeterminate moment that 
has the profile of a sacred mystery. 
This concise analysis of Albizu and Salgado’s extensive use of Christian 
terminology and themes in the construction of their respective political doctrines is 
interesting for the numerous, and sometimes almost literal, analogies between the two 
formulations. Nevertheless, the comparison also permits us to highlight the value of 
Emilio Gentile’s notion of “political religion” for the study of radical forms of 
nationalism and political mobilization. According to the Italian historian, ideologies or 
parties are examples of the peculiar process the he calls “sacralisation of politics” 
when they: (a) define the meaning of life and ultimate ends of human 
existence; (b) formalise the commandments of a public ethic to which all 
members of these movement [sic] must adhere; and (c) give utter 
importance to a mythical and symbolic dramatisation in their 
interpretation of history and reality, thus creating their own ‘sacred 
history’, embodied in the nation, the state or the party, and tied to the 
existence of a ‘chosen people’, which were glorified as the regenerating 
force of all mankind.161 
 
The main elements of this definition are easy to track in both authors’ discourses: 
the revelation of the final destiny of humankind; a rigorous code of behavior for the 
militants; a tragic reading of recent history and contemporary society; the nation as a 
sacred body to be revived through the relentless efforts of a selected community of 
inspired activists. Gentile also formulates a corollary to illustrate the view of the 
“political entity” of reference that this kind of phenomena elaborate, and it is even more 
precise in bringing to the surface the core of Albizu and Salgado’s thought. In fact, the 
nation acquires 
the characteristics of a sacred entity, that is, of a supreme power, 
indisputable and untouchable, which becomes the object of faith, of 
                                                 
161 Gentile, 29. 
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reverence, of cult, of fidelity, of devotion from the side of the citizens, up 
to and including the sacrifice of life; and as such it lies in the centre of the 
constellation of beliefs, of myths, of values, of commandments, of rites 
and of symbols.162 
 
A significant difference between Gentile’s interpretative model and the cases 
considered here concerns the crucial point of the relations between these innovative 
forms of sacral nationalism and historical faith, i.e. Catholicism. Indeed, another common 
feature that the Italian scholar detects in political religion is 
a hostile attitude toward traditional institutionalised religions, seeking to 
eliminate them, or seeking to establish with them a relationship of 
symbiotic coexistence, in the sense that the political religion seeks to 
incorporate traditional religion within its own system of beliefs and myths, 
assigning it a subordinate and auxiliary role.163 
 
This statement is clearly not applicable to either Albizu or Salgado, who on the 
contrary showed deference to orthodox Catholicism, and pursued a different path of 
identification and coexistence with it. Of course, Gentile has in mind the specific case of 
Italian fascism that inherited from the history of the peninsula a peculiar, conflicting 
relationship with the Catholic Church. 
In spite of this important distinction, the employment of Gentile’s concept, in 
association with Griffin’s ideal type of “generic fascism,” to situate in a comparative and 
supranational perspective the cases of Pedro Albizu Campos and Plínio Salgado allows to 
draw some overall conclusions not only on these specific examples, but also on the 
potential of novel approaches to studying the radical and revolutionary right in Latin 
America. 
                                                 
162 Ibid. 
163 Ibid., 30. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In my research, I have tried to demonstrate the usefulness of a rigorously 
conceived notion of fascism for the political and intellectual history of Latin America. To 
this end, I chose two cases from the 1930s that scholars rarely address in a comparative 
fashion, but frequently associate with a vague label of fascism. For sure, the PNPR and 
the AIB experiences are not completely comparable because of the enormous differences 
between the two countries, Brazil and Puerto Rico, and the apparently distinctive 
immediate goals of the two parties. Nevertheless, in my opinion, this dissimilarity renders 
the results of the comparison even more significant for the study of the revolutionary 
right in Latin America. 
The decision to employ Roger Griffin’s “generic fascism” ideal type and Emilio 
Gentile’s definition of “political religion” stemmed from a dissatisfaction with the 
prevailing uncritical appropriation of the term “fascism,” that, in addition, is generally 
employed to discredit the political movements and their leaders. This dismissive attitude 
was particularly frequent in the case of the PNPR and Albizu, as their groundbreaking 
project for Puerto Rican independence still highly controversial in current debates on the 
political status of the island. The recent methodological developments of the European 
school of fascist studies, of which Griffin and Gentile are major figures, permit us to use 
the concept of fascism as an analytical tool, cleansing it of the vagueness and polemical 
character that generally are its trademarks. Fascism, as any other concept, will always 
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maintain a high degree of arbitrariness and controversy, but scholars should work to 
counter the shortcuts often taken in the public debate when the term is introduced. If the 
goal is to give fascism a role in both academic research and political debate, its definition 
cannot be limited to any generic form of aggressive and intolerant public message or 
mobilization. A broad variety of violent and racist discourses and practices are surely 
crucial in historical and current fascist manifestations, but a closer attention to ideas, 
values, and worldviews can produce a more precise and insightful analysis of these 
phenomena. This is the direction that the study of fascism has taken since the 1960s, 
through the so called “culturalist turn,” when even the researches on the most long-
lasting, and temporally successful, fascist experiences in Italy and Germany started to 
explore the ideals that lay behind those regimes. This approach is particularly suitable for 
the study of doctrines and movements that never seized power, such as the two under 
examination here, since their unsuccessful struggle against the establishment enhanced 
their speculative and utopian components. 
The conjuncture in which Albizu and Salgado constructed their political projects 
unquestionably favored a hypercritical perspective on the general trends taking place in 
their respective countries, and in the global scene as a whole. In the early 1930s, the 
industrialized world, and the broad areas on which the United States and Europe exerted 
their colonial or neo-colonial control, such as Latin America, experienced a dramatic 
financial and economic crisis, that produced severe social consequences. From the 
standpoint of nations placed in a subaltern position within the international system, the 
apparent failure of capitalism, and the fragilities of the political ideology and institutional 
framework that had sustained it – liberalism – opened a novel space that could be filled 
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with radically new projects of nation, society, and state. In Latin America, the socialist 
option, in its many varieties, appealed to significant sectors of the population, including 
both the intellectual circles and the working classes, and notoriously constituted a 
noteworthy and durable current of thought and political activism. Nonetheless, an 
alternative and divergent tradition took shape in the same period, and, although it lacked 
the relative supranational cohesion and the common intellectual authorities of its leftist 
counterpart, its national varieties show some shared, fundamental features. The affinities 
among these radical right-wing experiences are particularly evident and intriguing if one 
observes how the ideologues articulated their political discourses around specific images 
of the past, interpretations of the present, propositions for the future, and identifiable 
languages. Indeed, my experimental comparison of the thought of two different figures 
such as Pedro Albizu Campos and Plínio Salgado, who lived and operated in two of the 
most dissimilar countries of the continent – Puerto Rico and Brazil – revealed a core of 
very similar, if not shared, visions and values. 
To begin with, both authors ground their political doctrines on a critical analysis 
of the foundations of modern society, and they identify in the economic system the origin 
of the decadence of humanity that culminated in the 1930s global crisis. With different 
tones, Albizu and Salgado blame capitalism as the major cause of their countries’ decay. 
In the Puerto Rican case, the sugar industry appears as the most outstanding example of 
the exploitative modes of production, not only imposed, but also directly controlled by a 
foreign power. On the other hand, the Brazilian intellectual points at the economic and 
political elite who accumulated wealth and power through the proceeds of the embryonic 
agro-industrial apparatus of his country. The prototypical foes that they outline – the 
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autochthonous collaborator it the US-controlled sugar business, for Albizu, and the 
Brazilian urban bourgeoisie, for Salgado – has the characteristics of the internal enemy: 
he is the traitor who cooperates with an invading and illegitimate authority, or who 
imports and adopts foreign habits and principles. This enemy is responsible for the 
destruction of the idealized pre-modern society that, in the authors’ discourse, is 
associated with fairer employment conditions for people and a general notion of 
harmony. What is even more central in Albizu and Salgado’s reflections is the fact that in 
modern times the working classes, whose labor is treated as a marketable commodity and 
benefits foreigners and a parasitical minority, are subjected to a process of spiritual 
impoverishment. It is important to highlight the fact that both leaders show a deep 
concern about the problems of the lower strata of the population. Contradicting the 
misconception that associates the sensitivity to the “social question” with the left, this 
innovative right-wing trends share at least an intuition about the rising role of the masses 
on the public scene. In this sense, both the PNPR and the AIB are constructed with the 
aim of competing on the same ground that the socialist and communist parties are trying 
to occupy. In fact, Albizu and Salgado consider the material poverty and the moral 
decadence that they disgustedly observe as the direct causes, on the one hand, of the 
passivity of the population in the face of injustices and marginalization; on the other 
hand, of illusory promises of participation and affluence. If Albizu is particularly fearful 
of the attraction of the Puerto Ricans for the individualistic and materialistic way of life 
in the United States, Salgado turns his attention to the ominous diffusion of communism 
in Brazil. The authors consider both threats as disruptive systems of values that 
undermine the cohesion of their countries, and as direct products of bourgeois, liberal 
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society. Significantly, Salgado puts the blame on the well-off for providing a negative 
behaviour pattern for the lower classes, and for helping the formulation and 
dissemination of radical leftist ideologies. Modernity, through capitalism and liberal 
democracy, reduced the masses to a condition of physical and moral brutalization, and 
left them completely defenseless in the face of the pernicious influences of its misleading 
messages. Therefore, the mission of Albizu and Salgado, in their different contexts, 
becomes the formulation of an authentic proposal of salvation that tightly connects 
together the key elements of what they consider the only horizon toward which humanity 
should project itself: the nation. 
Albizu and Salgado’s discourses on the crisis laid the foundations for the 
formulation of the palingenetic message that, according to Griffin’s proposal, 
characterizes the core of ideal-typical fascism. Only the perception and the propagation 
of an apocalyptic vision of the present, in fact, permits the authors to construct doctrines 
that clamor for rebirth and redemption. However, the second element that the British 
scholar stresses in his definition – ultranationalism – is equally important, and constitutes 
the setting for the political appeal of the two political leaders. Both authors produce a 
provocative reversal of the traditionally accepted hierarchies of nations, redefining 
crucial concepts such as “development” and “civilization”. For Salgado, Europe is the 
main element of comparison, both because it was the center of attraction for Brazilian 
intellectual and artistic circles, and as a consequence of his long foundational journey 
through the Old World in 1930. He observes a region that is in an irreversible state of 
ruin, and radically divided on the paths to be taken, both in the realm of culture and the 
economic and political sphere. Albizu naturally builds his polarization between the 
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United States and Puerto Rico, adopting the consolidated hispanista standpoint that 
opposes civilización and barbarie. Therefore, the colonial occupying power becomes a 
country of profound ignorance and inequality, whose pillar is greed.  
The two authors, having defined the general structure of their scale of values, 
resort to the same discursive resource in order to identify the borders of their specific 
national communities and, at the same time, to project their political proposal toward the 
broader world: the issue of race. In fact, both of them combine a strong culturalist and 
spiritualist approach to race with a discourse on “blood,” obtaining a utopian message 
that announces a pacific and harmonious future. While the Puerto Rican underscores the 
successful blending of European, African, and Native American blood on his island, 
under the beneficial aegis of the superior Greco-Roman tradition, the Brazilian identifies 
the indigenous tupi, the atavistic inhabitant of the continent, as the repository of 
authenticity, and as the common denominator of a forthcoming intermixed “perfect” race. 
In this way, Albizu and Salgado, using the different identity markers that they find in 
their respective countries’ pasts, link their idealized picture of pre-modern times with 
their political project, through the promise of a restored harmony. In other words, their 
palingenetic effort constitutes an attempt to synchronize the past with the future, in order 
to overcome a dispiriting present that is deceiving humanity and to place their respective 
countries in the center of the global scene. Therefore, the authors’ philosophy of history 
alters the positivistic vision of human experience as a linear and progressive 
development, which both liberal and socialist traditions accepted and transformed in the 
ideological foundation of modernity. Moreover, this trust in racial mixture as the 
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supposedly tried and tested solution to the social problems of Puerto Rico and Brazil 
permits the authors to forecast a sort of “imperialist task” for their homelands.  
Cultural and spiritual resources, and not the military or economic power, are 
obviously the instruments of this dream of globally reversing the process of human 
decadence. The explicit ambition of proposing themselves as the holders of a moral 
leadership, that should embrace Latin America as a whole and, in the long term, the 
world, undermines one of the most recurring arguments against the use of the category of 
fascism in the study of Salgado and Albizu. Indeed, especially in the examination of the 
latter, scholars tend to reject the term because of its close association with expansionism 
and imperialism.164 The bitter criticism toward intrusions by extraneous forces into 
nations that are struggling to establish themselves in their “authenticity” is thus taken to 
its logical extreme: the pretension to incarnate an alternative model that should be 
gradually adopted as a universal solution to the evils of modernity, well beyond the 
national borders. 
The discursive strength of Albizu and Salgado’s utopian arguments comes from 
their relationship with the semantic field of religion, that constitutes the last, crucial 
element of my comparative analysis. A close reading of the authors’ writings and 
speeches reveals the centrality of the Catholic tradition as a repertoire of terminology, 
images, symbols, and models for the construction of their thought, organizations, and 
leadership. In the examination of this project the third component of Griffin’s “generic 
fascism” – populism – and the potential of Gentile’s “political religion” are at stake. In 
fact, the charismatic guidance that both Albizu and Salgado exercise on their respective 
                                                 
164 This is the case in Rodríguez Vázquez, El sueño que no cesa, 204-209, and in the works of the Taller de 
Formación Política, La cuestión nacional and Pedro Albizu Campos. 
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parties is modeled on the paradigm of the enlightened prophet who leads a select few of 
apostles toward the accomplishment of the only, exclusive “authentic” plan for collective 
redemption. The Nation is of course the space in which the militants, imitating the leader, 
show their complete dedication to the cause, their commitment to the apostolate, and their 
acceptance of isolation, persecution, and, as necessary, martyrdom. Incidentally, this 
scheme is clearly consistent with Michel Foucault’s notion of “pastoral power,” that in 
fact the French philosopher closely connects with the Jewish-Christian tradition.165 
Nonetheless, this peculiar conception of political activity proves problematic. In the first 
instance, it entails the construction of a rigidly hierarchical and authoritarian 
organization, in which the preponderance of the values of discipline and loyalty cripples 
any possibility of internal criticisms toward and dissent from the official party line. 
Second, and more importantly, the pretension to incarnate the “organized Homeland” (in 
Albizu’s words), or the “organized patriotism” (according to Salgado), and thus to 
represent and serve the entire national community, clashes with the very sectarianism of 
those movements.  
This unresolved contradiction between, on the one hand, the universalistic ideals 
and goals of the PNPR and the AIB, and, on the other hand, their exclusivist and elitist 
configuration is probably the key reason of their failure. In fact, both parties, after failing 
to mobilize a substantial sector of the population, not only progressively fell into a spiral 
of violent, conspiratorial, and subversive activities that produced repression, but also had 
their revolutionary message weakened and plundered. Indeed, Getúlio Vargas in Brazil 
and Luís Muñoz Marín in Puerto Rico, of course in different ways and with different 
                                                 
165 Michel Foucault, Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a Criticism of ‘Political Reason’, lecture delivered at 
Stanford University on October 10 and 16, 1979., available from The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, 
<http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/documents/foucault81.pdf> (accessed 9 October 2008). 
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nuances, were able to hijack the populist core of Salgado and Albizu’s messages. After 
cleansing the latter of their radicalism, and in particular of their moralistic and quasi-
religious content, the two dominant figures of mid-20th century Brazilian and Puerto 
Rican politics had success in using the widespread dissatisfaction with modernity (i.e., 
for the vast majority of the population, with deteriorated socio-economic conditions), the 
new demands for mass participation in the construction of the state, and the process of 
formulation of a national ideology that also inspired Salgado and Albizu. The fact that the 
extremist political doctrines that the AIB and the PNPR defended in the 1930s has always 
remained confined to minority circles, and were finally overcome by more pragmatic and 
moderate settlements, does not mean they are irrelevant. 
I believe that it is time to tackle the historical study of the Latin American 
revolutionary right with new lenses. First of all, it is necessary to discard the well-
established conviction that movements such as the two I examined in this research are 
just exceptionally crude manifestations of mere conservatism and reaction, and the 
products of the visionary speculations of some insane, ambitious figures.166 Choosing and 
analyzing two apparently disparate cases such as the PNPR and the AIB, I was able to 
pinpoint not only some specific similarities between the two movements’ ideologies, but 
also the level of refinement of the political projects that they proposed, distancing 
themselves from a generic preservation of the existing conditions. Moreover, in the light 
                                                 
166 A revealing example of this contemptuous attitude can be found in the preface that the renowned 
sociologist Florestan Fernandes wrote for an intellectual history of Integralism published in 1979. The 
historical context of his assertions is, of course, that of the Brazilian military regime. “Hoje – Fernandes 
writes – está na moda dizer-se que se deve estudar o integralismo. Não compartilho dessa opinião. Nem 
mesmo devemos nos preocupar com destruí-lo. Os integralistas desempenharam o papel histórico de 
cavalheiros de triste figura no seio do pensamento conservador  e dentro da burguesia. Se merecem atenção 
não é tanto por eles próprios, quanto pelo fato de que o pensamento conservador e a burguesia dependente 
da periferia do mundo capitalista tenham precisado deles (e de outras modalidades igualmente equivocadas 
da defesa do status quo). O que nos coube, na ‘virada fascista’ da história recente, merece mais a novela 
picaresca que a investigação sociológica séria.” (Vasconcelos, A ideologia curupira, 11). 
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of the results of this experimental comparison, I would hypothesize that in the Latin 
America of the 1930s, even in very different contexts, similar political discourses were 
articulated, even without direct contacts and influences. This observation should open the 
doors to a transnational study of nationalism, even in its more radical and visionary 
formulations, addressing the most important questions and responses that intellectuals 
and political leaders throughout the subcontinent articulated around key issues such as 
identity, race, religion, and the formation of the nation state. In order to better 
comprehend and interpret these phenomena, I dared to use a specific definition of fascism 
because of the level of sophistication and accuracy that, in my opinion, the European 
school of fascist studies has recently attained, both theoretically and methodologically. 
Concepts such as “generic fascism” and “political religion” help to approach the topic of 
the revolutionary right in a less ideologically oriented fashion, and to avoid simplistic 
statements of contempt and insignificance. In this way, even Albizu and Salgado’s failed 
utopias can be properly studied in their problematic nature, and as political doctrines that 
directly and indirectly contributed to shape the public debate on the crucial dilemma 
about nation and nationalism in modern Latin America. 
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